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Contract Meta-Interpretation 
Shawn Bayern* 
This Article provides a general framework for resolving the contract 
law’s ambivalence between textualism and contextualism, one of the most 
difficult questions in modern contract interpretation. Simply put, the 
Article’s argument is that courts need to determine the parties’ preferences 
as to how their contracts should be interpreted; this “meta-interpretive” 
inquiry can then direct the court’s interpretation or construction of the 
parties’ substantive rights and duties. Moreover, the Article argues that 
while contextualist interpretation is not, and should not be, mandatory for 
all interpretive questions under contract law, contextualism is necessary to 
resolve the initial “meta-interpretive” question: What interpretive regime 
do the parties prefer? Recognizing this distinction, and applying this two-
step inquiry, can resolve some of the academic and practical debates 
between textualists and contextualists, and it can also explain some 
features of modern contract law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Interpretive questions are the core questions of contract law. 
Problems of assent, unexpected circumstances, and remedies can all be 
conceived through an interpretive lens.1 In addition to their 
theoretical and structural significance, interpretive questions are also 
among the most frequently litigated matters in contract cases.2 
Still, there is little agreement on the right approach to interpreting 
contracts.3 The interpretive debate centers on the tension between the 
impulse to do justice in individual cases and the desire to impose rules 
of general scope and application; this tension leads some (the 
“contextualists”) to favor a broad inquiry into the intent of contracting 
parties4 and others (the “textualists”) to favor a narrower, supposedly 
more predictable interpretive focus on the text of written contracts.5 
 
 1 See, e.g., Shawn Bayern, Offer and Acceptance in Modern Contract Law: A Needless 
Concept, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 67 (2015) (arguing that questions of contract formation 
are fundamentally interpretive questions); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in 
Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1127 (1994) 
[hereinafter Expression Rules] (presenting the interpretive basis for many individual 
rules governing contract formation); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, 
Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207, 211 (2009) [hereinafter 
Impossibility] (discussing a legal test for unexpected-circumstances cases that has a 
conceptual grounding in an interpretive question); George S. Geis, Empirically 
Assessing Hadley v. Baxendale, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 897, 952 (2005) (“Contract 
interpretation raises some of the same questions as Hadley . . . .”). 
 2 See STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 1 (2009) (“Issues 
of contract interpretation are important in American law. They probably are the most 
frequently litigated issues on the civil side of the judicial docket. They are central to 
the settlement of a larger number of contract disputes . . . .”); Alan Schwartz & Robert 
E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 926 & n.3 (2010) 
[hereinafter Redux] (summarizing sources). Similar patterns apply to a variety of more 
specialized cases, like online contracting and government contracting. See W. 
Stanfield Johnson, Interpreting Government Contracts: Plain Meaning Precludes Extrinsic 
Evidence and Controls at the Federal Circuit, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 635, 636 (2005); Ty 
Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese: Law and 
Technology of Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 88 (2008) (“With 
regard to the scope of issues involved in online contracting, the most frequent focus of 
litigation has been on laws related to the element of assent, followed by frequent 
arguments over unconscionability, public policy, and contract interpretation.”).  
 3 E.g., Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 929-30 (“[T]he interpretation 
debate has become both livelier and more highly contested than ever.”).  
 4 E.g., Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and 
Modern Economic Formalism, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 950 (2009) [hereinafter Rational 
Ignorance]; James W. Bowers, Murphy’s Law and The Elementary Theory of Contract 
Interpretation: A Response to Schwartz and Scott, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 587, 588-92 
(2005). 
 5 E.g., Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, 938-39; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. 
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The debate plays out along several dimensions: the contextualists 
focus more on the subjective intent of the parties, whereas the 
textualists objectivize “intent”;6 the contextualists admit a larger base 
of evidence whereas the textualists prefer a smaller base;7 the 
contextualists consider post-formation information, whereas the 
textualists would require that courts adopt the epistemic limitations of 
the parties at the time of contract formation.8 
I do not wish to hide my own biases: I think textualism, at least in 
its stronger forms, is a misguided approach to the interpretation of 
contracts, both on grounds of justice and grounds of efficiency.9 In my 
view, the commercial and juristic gains of enforcing the deal that 
parties actually made, when it is possible to discern that deal, clearly 
overwhelm the benefits that might derive from the purported 
regularity or reduced administrative costs of a textualist regime.10 
Moreover, I dispute that textualist regimes even achieve the 
predictability they purport to achieve or that they are any more 
administrable than rules that pay more attention to what individual 
parties wanted (or what reasonable parties in their circumstances 
would have wanted).11 
To advance the debate, however, my initial goal in this Article is to 
attempt to convince the opposing sides that there need not be a single 
answer — a single regime for interpreting contracts.12 Instead, 
 
Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 577 (2003) 
[hereinafter Contract Theory]. 
 6 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1743, 1756-60 (2000) [hereinafter Emergence] (discussing the objective and 
subjective strands in the history of contract interpretation). 
 7 Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 576 (“Put another way, a 
firm’s preference at contract time is to have courts make interpretations on the 
minimum evidentiary base unless it would be costless to widen the base. But it is not 
costless. As the permissible evidentiary base widens, each party has incentives to 
introduce more evidence and, in turn, will need to contest more evidence. Since trials 
are expensive, risk-neutral firms are Willistonians.”). 
 8 See Eisenberg, Emergence, supra note 6, at 1770 (“In short, modern contract law 
has appropriately moved from a static conception of interpretation, that tended to 
focus on the text as of the moment of contract formation, to a dynamic conception, 
that encompasses events before and after that moment. To put this differently, under 
modern contract law the text of a contract runs through time.”). 
 9 See generally Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4 (critiquing a prominent 
textualist argument made previously in Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5). 
 10 Cf. Shawn J. Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 65-81 (2012) 
[hereinafter Against Certainty] (critiquing the overuse of rhetoric concerning certainty 
and predictability in classical and modern legal argumentation).  
 11 See infra Part I.B. 
 12 I am indebted to the work of Schwartz and Scott, which I have critiqued in 
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textualists should recognize that their stated goals can be realized only 
in some, not in all, cases; contextualists, for their part, should 
recognize that a commitment to context and to the intent of 
contracting parties compels the adoption of an approach that looks 
more like textualism in several important circumstances.13 
The thesis of this article is straightforward; it has two parts. 
Importantly, the article’s central arguments do not concern contract 
interpretation itself; they concern meta-interpretation, or the selection 
of an interpretive regime to use when addressing interpretive 
questions.14 The article’s first, most general argument is that contracts 
should be interpreted using the methodology that best suits their 
circumstances on grounds of morality and policy. Apart from limited 
exceptions,15 the methodology that satisfies this criterion will be the 
one that the parties preferred — or, failing that, the one that 
reasonable parties in their circumstances would have preferred.16 The 
determination of this preference mirrors the underlying interpretive 
inquiry in contract law.17 This part of my thesis is not itself original; it 
is often latent, and occasionally expressed, as a premise in arguments 
 
other respects, for drawing the attention of academic commentary to this point. See, 
e.g., Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 930-31 (“Thus, we do not argue that the 
state should enact mandatory rules that require courts to make formalist 
interpretations. Rather, we argue that the state should create interpretative rules that 
instantiate party preferences . . . .”). In more recent work, Professor Scott and others 
have argued explicitly that even beyond contracting parties’ choices in individual 
cases, contract law’s interpretive regime need not be “unified,” and they have critiqued 
the notion (as this Article does) of a universally applicable interpretive regime. See 
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract 
Interpretation as Contract Design 1-2 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies 
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 469, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2394311. 
 13 See infra Part I. 
 14 This Article uses the prefix “meta-” in its now-familiar sense to refer to a 
recursive layer of abstraction, or a proposition about propositions. Cf. W.V. Quine, 
Logic Based on Inclusion and Abstraction, 2 J. SYMBOLIC LOGIC 145, 147 (1937) 
(introducing the notion of a “metatheorem”). Thus, interpretive analysis concerning 
interpretation is “meta-interpretation.” Cf. Arthur Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural 
Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1230 n.2 (attributing the witticism “[a]nything you can do, 
I can do meta” to his colleague Leon Lipson). Some sources credit the rise of the 
prefix in modern scholarship to DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, GÖDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN 
ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1979) (discussing recursion and meta-theory generally). 
 15 See infra Part I.B. 
 16 See infra Part I.A. 
 17 For a discussion of the underlying interpretive inquiry applied by modern 
contract law, see infra Part II. 
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on both sides of the debate about contract interpretation.18 Usually 
this principle’s role is simply to serve as one step in an argument that 
leads, monotonically or at least very generally, to a unitary interpretive 
regime that covers all or most cases.19 Instead, my argument is that 
this principle should provide the basis for the dynamic selection of an 
interpretive regime, a selection that may vary from situation to 
situation based on many relevant factors.20 
My second argument is that courts should adopt a contextualist 
mode of interpretation for determining the parties’ choice of an 
interpretive regime, at least in those cases where the parties’ choice of 
an interpretive regime matters. That is, courts should use all available 
information to determine the agreement that the parties had, or the 
agreement that reasonable parties would have had, about their 
preferred mode of interpretation, whether that mode ultimately be 
textualist, contextualist, or something else. 
I call the combination of these two principles meta-contextualism 
because it uses a contextualist mode of interpretation to answer the 
meta-interpretive question about what interpretive regime to apply.21 
Though at one level of generality meta-contextualism is sensitive to 
the circumstances that surround a contract, it tolerates much or all of 
the principles of textualist interpretation where the circumstances call 
for it — particularly, although not exclusively,22 where the parties 
preferred or would prefer a textualist interpretive regime. 
In showing how contract law should be pluralistic in the 
possibilities of interpretive regimes it considers, I also intend to show 
that contract law in fact already implements, somewhat covertly, the 
principles I suggest.23 For example, we can conceive the parol-
evidence rule as an important, though admittedly confused, step 
toward the recognition that written text does not always carry the 
same importance in all contractual settings.24 Similarly, we can 
harmonize what some commentators have argued is a mandatory 
 
 18 E.g., Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 930-32 (arguing that the 
interpretive regime should be subject to the choice of the parties); Gilson et al., supra 
note 12, at 1-2. 
 19 But see Gilson et al., supra note 12, at 1 (offering a more nuanced view that 
nonetheless suggests more formal divisions, and more of an inclination toward 
textualism, than this Article’s framework). 
 20 See infra Part II. 
 21 Cf. supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing terminology). 
 22 Contra Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 930-31 (arguing in favor of a 
default regime of textualism for contracts between most business firms). 
 23 See infra Part II. 
 24 See infra Part II. 
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contextualism in the law with the law’s occasionally textualist 
tendencies. And the classic differences between the merchant law and 
the common law suggest that the regulation of private contracts is 
open to plurality in interpretive methodologies. 
This article proceeds in two stages. First, in Part I, I critique a 
variety of what I consider to be problematic arguments in favor of the 
proposition that all parties, or a broad class of them, do or should 
prefer a single interpretive regime.25 I do this because the field is 
dominated by strong and often very sophisticated arguments for very 
particular rules of contract interpretation; I respect these analyses, but 
I believe they are ultimately mistaken. Having done this, I then in Part 
II affirmatively build up the more context-sensitive meta-interpretive 
principles that I have outlined above.26 In Part III, I briefly show how 
modern contract law already accommodates some of these principles. 
I. THE LIMITS OF GENERALIZED SOLUTIONS TO THE META-
INTERPRETIVE PROBLEM 
A chief contention of my “meta-contextualist” argument — that 
determining the parties’ chosen interpretive regime requires sensitivity 
to context-specific information about the parties’ preferences — relies 
on the more fundamental proposition that there is no general, context-
insensitive way to select a universal interpretive regime (or even one of 
broad application). If it were possible to show that a single interpretive 
regime (either textualist or contextualist) were appropriate to all 
situations, then courts should simply apply that regime; there would be 
no further meta-interpretive question to decide. 
Despite a variety of attempts to present a single interpretive regime 
as universally optimal — or even just as optimal in a large, very 
general class of cases27 — this Part contends that there has been no 
persuasive account of the reasons or scope for such a general 
interpretive regime. It does so first by critiquing the theoretical bases 
of such regimes — for example, the view that all parties, or at least all 
rational or reasonable parties, will prefer textualist modes of 
interpretation — and then by critiquing the empirical arguments in 
favor of such regimes. 
To be clear, I define meta-interpretation as the legal determination of 
the appropriate interpretive regime to apply in a particular case. 
 
 25 See infra Part I. 
 26 See infra Part II. 
 27 See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2 (arguing in favor of a default 
regime of textualism for contracts between most business firms). 
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Determining the legal meaning of the parties’ expressions is an 
interpretive question;28 determining the mechanism by which to 
determine that legal meaning is a meta-interpretive question. For 
example, if a written contract specifies that one of the parties must 
deliver “a dozen eggs,” the meaning of the words “dozen” and “eggs” 
raise interpretive questions.29 The different possibilities that a court 
faces in selecting an interpretive regime for answering this question — 
for example, relying on a dictionary, or admitting trade usage or 
course of dealing — raise meta-interpretive questions. 
A. Theoretical Derivations About Rational Contracting Parties: 
Schwartz and Scott on Contract Theory, Risk-Neutrality, and Textualism 
In an extremely influential article, Professors Alan Schwartz and 
Robert Scott in 2003 offered a theoretical economic argument that 
rational parties — and thus, according to them, business firms — 
prefer textualism; indeed, I take their argument to be the leading 
modern statement of the law-and-economics movement’s theoretically 
derived formalism.30 The argument is subtle, and I have critiqued 
some of its features in detail in prior work.31 After summarizing 
Schwartz and Scott’s argument, this Section quickly outlines my prior 
critique and then offers a new general critique in view of their more 
recent formulations of the argument.32 
At the outset, it is important to clarify that I share several significant 
premises with Schwartz and Scott. In particular, as I have noted above, 
I endorse their view that a single interpretive regime need not be 
appropriate in all cases.33 Moreover, with limited exceptions that I 
describe in Part III.B, I agree with Schwartz and Scott that the parties’ 
preferences should ordinarily dictate the choice of an interpretive 
regime.34 Moreover, even in specific cases where I do not think the 
parties’ preferences should dictate the choice of an interpretive regime, 
I believe their preferences are relevant to the court’s determination of 
the appropriate interpretive regime to use. With those agreements in 
 
 28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (1981) (“Interpretation of a 
promise or agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment of its meaning.”) 
 29 See id. § 200 cmt. b. 
 30 See generally Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5. As of September 
2015, according to Westlaw, the individual article had been cited 297 times. 
 31 See Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4, at 946 (critiquing Schwartz and 
Scott’s argument by, among other things, distinguishing probability from uncertainty). 
 32 See Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2. 
 33 Id. at 930-31. 
 34 Id. 
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mind, we differ only on the mechanism by which the interpretive 
regime should be chosen in individual cases. 
Schwartz and Scott’s approach to meta-interpretive questions in 
contract law is deductive and theoretical; that is, their method to 
address meta-interpretive questions is to deduce an answer based on 
the necessary behavior of rational parties, as modeled by formal 
economics. They do briefly survey empirical evidence that they believe 
supports their position,35 but their argument fundamentally attempts 
to demonstrate on theoretical grounds that rational parties, 
particularly business firms involving five or more people, are (1) 
necessarily risk-neutral and (2) as a result of that risk-neutrality, 
prefer a textualist mode of interpretation.36 My most practical 
disagreements with Schwartz and Scott are that I deny that business 
firms are necessarily risk-neutral and that risk-neutral firms 
necessarily prefer textualism. 
To understand the debate, it will be helpful to elaborate Schwartz 
and Scott’s deductive model in some detail. The essential insight of 
their model, which is quite intuitively appealing at first, is that a risk-
neutral party will be a contract textualist because admitting more 
evidence increases the costs of litigation without changing the 
expected value of the court’s interpretive result.37 This conclusion 
depends on a model of interpretive results as (1) reducible to scalar 
values that (2) have a mean value that is invariant to the amount of 
evidence used during the interpretive process.38 Moreover, their model 
 
 35 Id. at 955-57. 
 36 See id. at 947-56. 
 37 Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 574-77 (“Thus, courts that 
interpret contracts as typical parties prefer would be indifferent to variance as well, 
and sensitive only to the costs of administering their evidentiary standard.”). I of 
course mean “expected value” in the literal technical sense as defined in the analysis 
of random variables. See, e.g., CHRISTIAAN HUYGENS, DE RATIOCINIIS IN LUDO ALEÆ 
(1657) (introducing the basic notion underlying the modern understanding of 
random variables). 
 38 See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 575-76 (“In other 
words, the court is as likely to make an interpretation that is more favorable to the 
buyer (less favorable to the seller) than the correct answer as the court is likely to 
make a less favorable interpretation. Judicial errors therefore cancel, in expectation.”). 
This point is the focus of much of my prior critique: 
[Suppose] [w]e are told that a court is going to pick some number from 
among all whole numbers (that is, from the range of numbers that looks like 
“. . . –3, –2, –1, 0, 1, 2, 3 . . .” where both ends extend to infinity). 
Furthermore, we are told that there is no more reason to suppose this 
number will be greater than fifty rather than less than fifty. From this, it 
might be tempting to conclude that the expected value of the number the 
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of the difference between textualism and contextualism — which I 
accept for the purposes of this discussion — is also essentially scalar; 
the different interpretive modes simply allow a court to use a larger or 
smaller “evidentiary base”39 to carry out its interpretive process. On 
one end of the spectrum, a court might flip a coin (using no evidence 
at all). On the other, a court might use all relevant evidence that the 
parties submit. Schwartz and Scott’s argument for textualism is an 
argument for what they call the “minimum evidentiary base,” which 
includes specifically “the parties’ contract, a narrative concerning 
whether the parties performed the obligations that the contract 
appears to require, a standard English language dictionary, and the 
interpreter’s experience and understanding of the world.”40 
I have previously given an example of how I understand the way in 
which Schwartz and Scott intend for their model to work: 
Suppose my contracting partner and I agreed on the number 
fifty. Schwartz and Scott’s central conclusion is that even if the 
larger base of information reduces my risk (say, makes it 
nearly certain that the court will decide on the number fifty, 
rather than something between thirty and seventy), using this 
larger base of information will not be worthwhile because of 
its costs: I’ll have to introduce more evidence, contest more 
evidence, go through a longer trial, and pay my lawyers more. 
Given that I didn’t care about the risk (formally, the variance) 
in the court’s result in the first place, I would prefer not to pay 
to reduce it.41 
My earlier critique of this model was quite technical and drew a 
distinction between the lack of systematic bias and the affirmative 
assertion of a statistical mean; it thus depended on the difference 
 
court will pick is fifty. After all, if we have no reason to suppose that the 
court’s number will be higher or lower than fifty, then it seems like each 
possibility is equally likely in fully symmetric ways, and thus the average 
value appears to be fifty. Reasoning in this way, however, is fallacious. Just 
because we have no reason to believe that the court’s number is more likely 
to be greater than fifty than it is to be less than fifty, and vice versa, does not 
mean that the expected value of the court’s number is fifty. Consider that we 
might also have no reason to believe the number is going to be higher or 
lower than sixty, or seventy, or any other given number. 
Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4, at 961. 
 39 Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 575. 
 40 Id. at 572. 
 41 Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4, at 954-55. 
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between uncertainty and probability.42 But a response to Schwartz and 
Scott’s argument need not be so technical; moreover, a technical 
response could conceivably fail to respond to a more general insight 
that their model suggests, which is simply that a contextualist 
interpretive regime has costs that a textualist interpretive regime 
might productively avoid.43 This Section develops a variety of more 
general responses to Schwartz and Scott’s model. 
1. Risk-Neutrality 
First, it is important to consider the premises of the argument. 
Schwartz and Scott intend for their model to apply to all risk-neutral 
parties.44 As they recognize, this is not a small limitation on the 
application of their deductive recommendations because, for example, 
economists frequently model individual people as risk-averse rather 
than risk-neutral.45 (The terms risk-averse and risk-neutral are 
specialized but have easily accessible meanings: a risk-neutral party 
would be indifferent between receiving $500 and a 50% chance of 
winning $1,000; a risk-averse party would prefer the certain $500 to 
the risky bet with an identical expected value.)46 Accordingly, they 
intend for their model to apply only to contracts between firms; they 
would rule out from their analysis all contracts where at least one of 
the parties is an individual.47 
Even this application, however, is questionable, because not all 
firms are risk-neutral. It is standard in economic commentary to treat 
business firms as if they are risk-neutral, because economists typically 
model business firms as if they maximize profit. As Schwartz and Scott 
say, their claim is that “firms maximize expected profits” and “[p]rofit 
maximization implies risk neutrality.”48 This implication is sound on 
logical grounds if the premises are correct; if a firm were risk-averse, it 
would not be maximizing expected profits because it would prefer a 
lower but definite expected value (e.g., $499) over a riskier but higher 
value (e.g., a 50% chance of receiving $100), just as individuals would. 
The problem, however, is simply that the economic modeling of an 
 
 42 See id. at 960-72. 
 43 See Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 930. 
 44 Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 565 & n.44. 
 45 See generally Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at n.49. 
 46 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 44-49 (5th ed. 2008); 
Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4, at 954. 
 47 See Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4, at 946-47. 
 48 Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 947. 
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entity does not imply that the model matches the entity’s properties in 
the real world or under the legal conceptions of business firms. If 
Schwartz and Scott’s claim is that “firms maximize expected profits,” it 
is trivial to falsify that claim with a counterexample because many 
firms, in the real world, do not maximize expected profits. Many, by 
law, can or must consider values other than profits; for example, 
Delaware recently passed a statute permitting “public benefit 
corporations” that balance profits with other goals. The key section of 
the statute reads as follows: 
The board of directors shall manage or direct the business and 
affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that 
balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best 
interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s 
conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits 
identified in its certificate of incorporation.49 
This counterexample is admittedly somewhat facile; Schwartz and 
Scott might happily be willing to exempt the relatively few “public 
benefit corporations” from an updated version of their analysis.50 My 
initial point, however, is only that “firms” is not the right category and 
requires, at a minimum, further restriction. 
As it happens, in their original statement of their argument, 
Schwartz and Scott did not mean to include all firms in their model; 
they restricted their argument’s scope explicitly to the following group 
of entities: 
(1) an entity that is organized in the corporate form and that 
has five or more employees, (2) a limited partnership, or (3) a 
professional partnership such as a law or accounting firm. 
These economic entities can be expected to understand how to 
 
 49 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2015). 
 50 It is, however, interesting to point out the role that profit-maximization plays in 
their argument: Schwartz and Scott assume risk-neutrality as a result of profit 
maximization. As a result, while I suspect the structure of their argument requires 
them to exempt public-benefit corporations that might be an odd result because there 
is little evident reason that a public-benefit corporation would or would not prefer 
textualism or contextualism in a contract dispute on that basis alone. At least loosely, 
this observation reinforces my argument, supra note 44 and accompanying text, that 
the form of an entity is a poor basis for guessing that entity’s preferred decision to 
meta-interpretive questions, at least once the analysis shifts to real firms rather than 
modeled, theoretical ones. 
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make business contracts, and the theory we develop applies 
only to contracts between two such firms.51 
This category, however, is still far too broad if the goal is to identify 
risk-neutral entities. More generally, if the goal is indeed to allow 
parties to choose the interpretive regime that governs them, assuming 
a preference for textualism in the entire foregoing group would be 
unjustified for several reasons. 
First, as the existence of public-benefit corporations suggests, the 
role of corporations is broader, in the real world, than economists 
typically conceive it to be. I do not want to overstate this point; I 
readily admit that profit-seeking is a major goal — probably the chief 
goal, and probably appropriately so — of American business 
corporations. But the economic analysis of entities often misses 
subtleties in their operational and legal characteristics and structure, 
and, as a result, “an entity that is organized in the corporate form and 
that has five or more employees”52 is unlikely to track risk-neutrality 
in any meaningful way. 
For one thing, the considerations permitted by Delaware’s new 
statute authorizing public-benefit corporations are not unique across 
corporate law and are not limited to a special class of socially 
conscious corporations. Many states, as a default rule, permit or 
require boards of directors of regular business corporations to balance 
a variety of goals in making business judgments. For example, New 
York’s corporate law reads as follows: 
In taking action . . . a director [of a corporation] shall be 
entitled to consider, without limitation, (1) both the long-term 
and the short-term interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders and (2) the effects that the corporation’s actions 
may have in the short-term or in the long-term upon any of 
the following: 
(i) the prospects for potential growth, development, 
productivity and profitability of the corporation; 
(ii) the corporation’s current employees; 
(iii) the corporation’s retired employees and other 
beneficiaries receiving or entitled to receive retirement, 
welfare or similar benefits from or pursuant to any plan 
sponsored, or agreement entered into, by the corporation; 
 
 51 Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 545. 
 52 Id. 
  
1110 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:1097 
(iv) the corporation’s customers and creditors; and 
(v) the ability of the corporation to provide, as a going 
concern, goods, services, employment opportunities and 
employment benefits and otherwise to contribute to the 
communities in which it does business.53 
Despite the prevalence of economists’ conceptions of firm as risk-
neutral profit maximizers, no lawyer would assume, given this legal 
structure, that every corporation organized in New York would act in 
a single, easy-to-characterize way. For one thing, the statute explicitly 
admits goals other than profit-maximization into the calculus of those 
who oversee the firm. For another, it problematizes simple 
conceptions of “profit maximization” by, for example, permitting 
directors to consider “both the long-term and the short-term interests 
of the corporation and its shareholders.”54 Even if risk-neutrality 
harmonizes with the maximization of the long-term interests of 
shareholders, it may well be within the “short-term interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders” to optimize profits subject to 
constraints upon risk; indeed, it is hard to imagine what the difference 
between short-term and long-term interests are unless those interests 
diverge based partly on a tolerance for risk. This is because a fully 
rational, risk-neutral party facing no time pressure would presumably 
perceive no differences between “the long-term and the short-term 
interests.”55 
More fundamentally, corporations and other legal entities are not 
simple or easily susceptible to formal modeling; far from being 
managed by machines or anything resembling an academic conception 
of rationality,56 they are human endeavors subject to complex legal 
and organizational structures. As corporate statutes make clear,57 even 
 
 53 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (2015). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality 
Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 583-87 
(1999) (tracing the intellectual history of the idea); see also MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, 
PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 47 (1986) 
(presenting the idea of an ownerless corporation as a theoretical exercise); Shawn 
Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 
NW. U. L. REV. 1485 (2014) (describing a realistic mechanism, in view of legal and 
technological developments, by which organizational law may permit ownerless for-
profit entities operated by algorithm). 
 57 E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2006) (outlining the powers of the 
corporate board of directors).  
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if the board decides on a strategy to maximize profits, it ordinarily 
pursues that agenda either by voting among people or, more 
typically,58 by hiring individual executives who act as agents of the 
corporation.59 If humans are risk-averse, it is difficult to conceive the 
firms they operate as necessarily risk-neutral. Even if corporate 
structures mitigate the so-called irrationality of people, nothing 
guarantees that they do so entirely. 
Much of the discipline of corporate law, indeed, aims to address the 
agency problems that arise between shareholders and directors — that 
is, between those who residually stand to earn the firms’ profits and 
those who make decisions in pursuit of those profits.60 Any private 
goal of the directors, without which there would not be much need for 
corporate law or the extensive commentary it has generated,61 
undermines the notion that a corporation is necessarily risk-neutral in 
anything approaching the sense in which Schwartz and Scott would 
need it to be for their meta-interpretive argument to hold. 
Finally, corporations may set, by charter, many not-for-profit 
purposes. Indeed, though again this is not meant as a serious objection 
to Schwartz and Scott’s argument on its own, corporations (including, 
of course, those with more than five employees) may easily be 
organized as not-for-profit corporations.62 But they may also be set up 
as for-profit corporations that give power to individual people or 
entities who are not legally required, and who do not in fact, 
 
 58 See MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 4-
14 (1976) (discussing the evolution of the board of directors from management to 
oversight). 
 59 See id. at 20-31. 
 60 See id. at 31-40; REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 8-16 (2004); John. C. Coates IV, Explaining 
Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1303-05 
(2001) (offering an institutional analysis that considers the agency problems in 
corporate law associated with lawyers); Zohar Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency 
Costs: A United States–Israeli Comparative View, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 
100-02 (1998) (describing the importance and extent of agency costs in a comparative 
study of corporate law). 
 61 See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 5.01 (1994); EISENBERG, supra 
note 58, at 40-62. 
 62 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5150–5153 (2015). For LLCs, see UNIF. LTD. LIAB. 
CO. ACT § 104 (2006) [hereinafter “ULLCA”] (“A limited liability company may have 
any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for profit.”). Distinguishing for-profit from 
not-for-profit LLCs under the ULLCA has no obvious or formal solution; it would 
require, in the general case, a substantive review of the LLC’s operating agreement and 
perhaps the history of the LLC’s operation. See generally id. § 104 cmt. b (discussing 
the ULLCA’s “expansive approach” to including different types of organizations under 
a single umbrella form).  
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uniformly seek profit for shareholders — much less in a perfectly risk-
neutral manner.63 For example, the Model Business Corporation Act 
allows directors to take many actions that do not directly seek profit, 
such as aiding scientific progress or making charitable contributions,64 
and in general corporate charters may specify or authorize goals 
beyond simple profit-maximization.65 This is not just an academic 
point; it is intended as a sharply realistic one in an age where many 
familiar corporations are controlled by small blocks of special 
shareholders who can pursue their own conceptions of the 
corporation’s best interests with little practical opportunity for legal 
challenge.66 
Schwartz and Scott’s categorization of limited partnerships and 
professional partnerships as necessarily risk-neutral is similarly 
overbroad, for mostly similar reasons. Like corporations — 
particularly private or closely held ones — unincorporated business 
entities often, in practice or even as a matter of legal right, are often 
structured in ways that do not suggest perfect profit maximization or 
risk-neutrality.67 For example, the typical limited partnership gives 
exclusive operational control over the operations of an entity to a 
single party or a small group of them — the general partners — and 
these partners can act as they see fit,68 limited for the most part only 
by fiduciary duties.69 The mere organizational status suggests little 
about risk-neutrality. 
Much of my criticism of Schwartz and Scott’s argument, on this 
score, is mainly that it incorrectly identifies firms that are likely to be 
risk-neutral when they enter contracts. Had they limited their 
 
 63 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2006) (authorizing conduct that does not 
directly maximize corporate profit); Id. §§ 8.30(b), 8.31 (outlining default standards 
of governance that may be displaced by charter). 
 64 Id. § 3.02. 
 65 Id. § 2.02 (permitting the corporate articles to vary corporate purpose). 
 66 E.g., Matthew Yglesias, All Hail, Emperor Zuckerberg: How Facebook’s IPO Gives a 
Stunning and Unprecedented Amount of Power to Its CEO, SLATE, (Feb. 3, 2012, 3:29 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2012/02/facebook_s_ipo_how_mark_ 
zuckerberg_plans_to_retain_dictatorial_control_his_company_.html. 
 67 See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 110(a) (2001) (permitting the partnership 
agreement to specify arbitrary provisions that govern the partnership). 
 68 Id. § 406 (“Each general partner has equal rights in the management and 
conduct of the limited partnership’s activities. Except as expressly provided in this 
[Act], any matter relating to the activities of the limited partnership may be 
exclusively decided by the general partner or, if there is more than one general 
partner, by a majority of the general partners.”). 
 69 Id. § 408 (enumerating fiduciary duties within limited partnerships). For more 
information, see SHAWN J. BAYERN, CLOSELY HELD ORGANIZATIONS 177-91 (2014). 
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argument to contracts between publicly traded firms, or firms over a 
certain market capitalization, I would have less to complain about, 
although it still will prove very difficult to draw broad organizational 
lines aimed at the distinction that their argument needs to draw 
between risk-neutral parties and those that may act in risk-averse (or 
for that matter risk-preferring) ways. Without substantially more 
empirical evidence, I do not see how any lawyer could perceive them 
to have made a plausible case that the organizations they identify are, 
in the real world, necessarily risk-neutral. 
In the end, one of my principal disagreements with Schwartz and 
Scott’s argument is that the identification of textualist contracting 
parties cannot proceed along the general lines they have drawn. As I 
will develop later in Part II, the question of parties’ meta-interpretive 
preferences requires substantially more attention to context. 
Importantly, it is probably impossible to identify an entity and, from 
that identification alone, infer that the entity was entirely risk-neutral 
in making all its contracts. To their credit, Schwartz and Scott do 
recognize this point, but they seem to bury that recognition, perhaps 
for rhetorical reasons. Thus, for example, they make two telling 
admissions that suggest they agree that a single firm may act in ways 
that are occasionally risk-neutral and occasionally risk-sensitive. First, 
they admit that firms are not risk-neutral, and thus presumably might 
prefer a contextualist mode of interpretation for their contracts, when 
“a correct interpretation is particularly important to them.”70 They 
dismiss this case, however, merely by saying “[f]ew business contracts 
have this ‘bet the ranch’ character, however.”71 This dismissal is 
surprising, if only because of the number of firms that fail, that run 
into trouble, or that for whatever other reasons have a “particularly 
important” contract or set of contracts that went badly for them. The 
force of Schwartz and Scott’s argument is essentially that parties are 
happy to be textualists only when their contracts do not matter to 
them; maybe few individual contracts matter to the largest 
corporations, but it is surely not uncommon for firms in general to 
have “particularly important” contracts.72 Second, Schwartz and Scott 
 
 70 Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 947. As they note, they elaborate this 
point in more detail in their original statement of their argument in Schwartz & Scott, 
Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 575-77. 
 71 Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 947-48. 
 72 Reviewing any first-year contracts casebook turns up many cases that would 
have a “bet the ranch” character for firms. Among interpretation cases alone, LON L. 
FULLER ET AL., BASIC CONTRACT LAW (9th ed. 2013), a leading contract-law casebook, 
includes several cases that would have this character. For example, Beanstalk Grp., 
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note that risk-neutral firms commonly enter into contracts to hedge, 
assign, or otherwise mitigate risk, which is hard to explain if firms are 
uniformly risk-neutral: 
A third motive to contract is to transfer risk from more to less 
risk-averse parties. The legal enforcement of these contracts 
sometimes is necessary because the transferee of risk has an 
incentive to breach when large risks materialize. Risk-shifting 
contracts are not considered here, in part because one of the 
parties to them commonly is an insurer, and insurance 
contracts are the subject of a distinct and heavily regulated 
legal field. Moreover, although many contracts have an 
insurance component (e.g., commodities contracts, currency 
hedging), these contracts tend not to give rise to litigation.73 
The dismissal of this possibility is surprising as well. It is important to 
note that it is logically incomplete; the possibility of risk-averse 
parties’ entering risk-shifting contracts is ignored because commonly 
one is an insurer (not because one party is always an insurer), and 
because other sorts of risk-shifting contracts tend not to give rise to 
litigation — an unsupported empirical observation that, while 
probably true for financial instruments like options contracts, is 
questionable in the case of supply and output contracts that so 
commonly shift risks.74 
In short, the economic assumption that firms are risk-neutral may 
work in economic theory, but there is little reason to believe that the 
tendency toward risk-neutrality is strong enough in the real world to 
perform the function that Schwartz and Scott need it to perform. Their 
argument aims to set actual legal policy, not to advance an economic 
model for the sake of economic discussion. If the goal is to do what 
commercial parties want, it is not enough merely to assume that they 
want textualism. 
2. The Limits of Scalar Interpretive Modeling 
My earlier work developed in some detail a technical objection to 
Schwartz and Scott’s argument. In short, the objection was that 
 
Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 2002), involves a claim to 35% of 
the value of the “Hummer” line of automobiles. 
 73 Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 565 n.44. 
 74 See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(granting specific enforcement on a contract for the sale of natural gas because, even 
though the gas was not unique, the purpose of the contract was to arrange a supply of 
gas to avoid the risk of market changes or market failure). 
  
2016] Contract Meta-Interpretation 1115 
asserting that courts’ interpretations of contracts lacks bias is different 
from asserting that there is a definite mean numeric value around 
which the courts’ interpretations will fall.75 If there is no definite 
mean, then there is no reason for parties to trust that courts will, on 
average, reach the “correct” result.76 There is way to state a broader 
objection more generally and with less technical language, however. 
Recall that Schwartz & Scott’s argument depends on the notion that 
courts, on average, will reach the right interpretive result even if, in 
individual cases, they will diverge from the parties’ initial 
expectations.77 This is, after all, what makes their assumption of risk-
neutrality relevant; they conclude that risk-neutral parties prefer 
textualism specifically because they would prefer not to pay for more 
precise interpretation in individual cases.78 Under Schwartz and Scott’s 
model, the parties initially contract and have a shared idea of what 
they have agreed to do, but it is too expensive to draft a contract that 
covers every possible contingency.79 A question later arises about the 
rights and duties of the parties. The parties’ original conception could 
answer this problem in theory, but because of the limitations of the 
drafting process, this original conception is not verifiable to the 
court.80 If the parties are textualists, they commit the question to the 
court knowing that the expected value of the court’s interpretive 
distribution is the parties’ original conception.81 
The difficulty with conceiving information and communication in 
this way is that it assumes that the parties can use, at the time when 
they produce their contract, language that produces a distribution 
with a known mean but is nonetheless ambiguous and leads to 
different outcomes in courts. Though this is potentially conceivable in 
theory, it is implausible in practice. I believe the difficulty lies 
specifically in the translation of Schwartz and Scott’s admittedly 
insightful formal model to real cases. It is one thing, in other words, to 
 
 75 See Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4, at 961-62. Schwartz and Scott 
responded to my critique in their most recent statement of their argument, Schwartz 
& Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 945 n.47, merely by distinguishing uniform from 
normal distributions. It is not clear how that is a response to my critique, because my 
argument was that their argument justifies no particular model’s distribution. 
 76 See Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4, at 960 & n.53. 
 77 See Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 573-84. 
 78 See id. at 574-77. 
 79 Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 954-55; Schwartz & Scott, Contract 
Theory, supra note 5, at 598-601. 
 80 “Verifiability” is a term of art in economic contract theory. See Schwartz & 
Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 605-08. 
 81 See id. at 592-93. 
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talk of a mean interpretive result; it is another to make the concept 
operational and tie it to real contract language. Schwartz and Scott 
never make clear the paradigmatic contract language they have in 
mind, nor do they argue that such paradigmatic cases are an 
appropriate basis on which to construct default legal rules. This 
abstraction ends up undermining their argument. 
Consider more specifically: if the parties can use language that leads 
to a known and agreed-upon interpretive mean, why does any 
ambiguity remain? Schwartz and Scott describe the language that 
generates a known mean as follows: 
It is optimal for risk-neutral firms to invest resources in 
drafting until the writing is sufficiently clear, in an objective 
sense, so that the mean of the distribution of possible judicial 
interpretations is the correct interpretation i* [i.e., a scalar 
value corresponding to the correct interpretation]. Contracts 
sketched out in less detail than this would generate 
interpretation distributions whose mean could be anywhere.82 
But if the parties are confident that the language they use will produce 
a definite mean result — a particular value i* — why does any 
ambiguity remain in the language they have used? Why can’t the 
courts settle uniformly on the mean interpretive result, which is 
evidently public knowledge anyway? In other words, what room in the 
real world remains for specific purposive language that is 
characterized by two propositions: (1) there is general agreement on 
the “mean” interpretation, but (2) there is nonetheless symmetrical 
variance around this mean as a result of uncertainty? 
With respect, it seems that Schwartz and Scott’s model permits a 
much narrower conclusion than they intend. They wish to show that 
all risk-neutral parties prefer textualism, but it appears they have 
shown, at most, that such parties prefer textualism specifically for 
terms about which there is no possible real-world dispute. This is 
because, for language with an uncontroversial mean interpretive result 
that has symmetric variance, no ambiguity remains; there would be 
little reason for anyone, including courts, to adopt a meaning other 
than the known mean value. 
To put it differently, how can a legitimate dispute arise out of a 
publicly known distribution? If there is a legitimate dispute about 
language, why would there be an agreement about the mean 
interpretive result ex ante; conversely, if there were a general 
 
 82 Id. at 577. 
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agreement, why would ambiguity remain? Note that this is not simply 
a case where the parties have a private understanding of terms that 
they cannot prove to courts,83 because under Schwartz and Scott’s 
model, their expectation is specifically that the courts will reach a 
mean interpretive result (with some expected variance). 
Even putting this problem aside, it is hard to discern a meaningful 
justification for the “minimal evidentiary base” based on theoretical 
argumentation alone, rather than an argument with more empirical 
sensitivity. Recall that the “minimal evidentiary base” they promote, 
and consider to be textualist, is “the parties’ contract, a narrative 
concerning whether the parties performed the obligations that the 
contract appears to require, a standard English language dictionary, 
and the interpreter’s experience and understanding of the world.”84 
Schwartz and Scott’s assertion of this base of evidence as the minimal 
necessary for courts to reach correct interpretive results on average 
appears to rest only on their intuitions about the costs and utility of 
different classes of evidence. It is hard to see how the practical 
question of evidentiary utility could be decided as a theoretical matter; 
there simply isn’t enough information in the theory to conclude that 
“a dictionary” is useful but that trade usage is not justified by its 
administrative costs.85 Schwartz and Scott would presumably agree 
that flipping a coin — despite incurring administrative costs 
drastically lower than typical adjudication — is insufficient for courts 
to reach the right interpretive result on average,86 but why is a 
dictionary plus a stochastic resolution sufficient? What affirmative 
argument is there for the minimal evidentiary base?87 
 
 83 Economic contract theorists refer to this case as one where information is 
“observable but not verifiable.” See Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 
605 (“A datum of information is ‘observable but not verifiable’ if a party can observe 
it, but cannot verify the information’s existence to a third party such as a court at an 
acceptable cost.”). 
 84 Id. at 572. 
 85 I mean this information-theoretic point in a technical sense — specifically, that 
the information contained in an expression of the theory is insufficient to derive such 
complex specifics regarding textual sources. Cf. Andrei N. Kolmogorov, Logical Basis 
for Information Theory and Probability Theory, 14 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 
662 (1968) (relating information theory to compressibility and complexity). 
 86 Given that plaintiffs can specify the interpretive question at issue, an 
interpretive regime that rests on a coin flip would encourage plaintiffs to ask 
implausible interpretive questions because they would have a 50% chance of being 
judged “correct” as to those questions. 
 87 Cf. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of 
Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43, 47-48 
(2007) (identifying parties’ incentives to behave opportunistically under textualist 
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3. Dynamic Versus Static Analysis: The Possibility of Settlement 
I have previously identified a problem for Schwartz and Scott’s 
stochastic view of courts.88 Simply speaking, if the parties agree on the 
court’s mean interpretive result and they are risk-neutral, why would 
they ever litigate a contract in the first place? In some respects, this is 
the ex post mirror image of argument in the previous Section that 
language with a known mean is unambiguous. The point here is 
stronger, though: language with a known mean is not worth litigating. 
To put it differently, if Schwartz and Scott’s model actually applied to 
contracting parties, it is difficult to see why they would ever bring a 
lawsuit — and thus difficult to see why the argument should be a basis 
for a widespread meta-interpretive default. If lawsuits are not brought, 
parties do not experience the litigation costs that Schwartz and Scott’s 
textualist argument aims to permit to them avoid. 
To summarize, then, despite a recent defense of it, Schwartz and 
Scott’s model remains difficult to apply in a legal setting. Their 
assumptions about risk-neutrality are stronger than is appropriate for 
a legal, rather than an economic, analysis; their model, insightful as it 
is in theory, is difficult to apply to real cases; and if it were correct, it 
would prove too much because it would make litigation unnecessary 
in the first place. 
Nonetheless, in responding as I have done to their argument, I do 
not wish to minimize their concerns about the costs of dispute 
resolution. I take those costs to be the chief modern reason that 
contract textualism is at least plausible in some contexts. Costs do 
matter. As Schwartz and Scott put it: 
[A]lthough accurate judicial interpretations are desirable, 
accurate interpretations are costly for parties and courts to 
obtain. . . . [I]f adjudication were costless, courts could 
minimize interpretive error by hearing all relevant and 
material evidence. . . . Since no interpretive theory can justify 
devoting infinite resources to achieving interpretive accuracy, 
any socially desirable interpretive rule would trade off 
accuracy against . . . adjudication costs.89 
This is correct, so far as it goes. My disagreement with Schwartz and 
Scott arises only when they purport to derive a specific default legal 
rule of extremely widespread applicability (covering, as they wish to 
 
interpretive regimes). 
 88 Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4, at 968-71. 
 89 Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 930. 
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do, contracts between all but the smallest firms) on the basis of 
theoretical deductions. There is also, perhaps, a difference in 
emphasis. While it is surely right that “no interpretive theory can 
justify devoting infinite resources to achieving interpretive accuracy,” 
infinite resources were never on the table — at least not in the real 
world. In real cases, evidentiary bases are discrete rather than 
continuous and context-specific rather than context-neutral; the 
question is not “[c]an we pick a number corresponding to how much 
evidence to admit” but rather “[i]s this particular piece of evidence 
admissible?” Moreover, rules of evidence already serve as barrier to 
the (already extremely remote) possibility that the world will devote 
all its economic resources to the resolution of contract disputes.90 
Accordingly, while Schwartz and Scott are clearly right to argue that 
evidence must be cut off at some point, that observation alone does 
not lead to anything like a widespread textualist default. Perhaps it 
leads only to a recognition that it is useful to keep, rather than to 
throw away, evidence law.91 
B. Empirical Evidence About Actual Contracting Parties 
Some commentators have adduced what they believe is empirical 
support for a broad rule — perhaps just a default rule — of textualism. 
Usually arguments along these lines take the following form: because 
parties do X, they prefer textualism, and thus textualism is a sensible 
default meta-interpretive rule.92 These arguments have, so far, been 
unpersuasive. It is important to recognize, however, that such 
arguments have the capacity to be persuasive. If it were truly the case 
that all parties of a particular type always preferred textualism, and if an 
empirical study could establish this preference convincingly, then the 
study would indeed be a sound argument in favor of textualism in the 
cases to which it applied. The problem is not with the enterprise of the 
empirical analysis of parties’ meta-interpretive preferences; the problem 
is simply that those making arguments based on empirics have, so far, 
generalized too broadly from the available data. 
Before considering particular empirical arguments, it may help to lay 
some general groundwork. The modern empirical economic arguments, 
 
 90 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to 
administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and 
securing a just determination.”). 
 91 See generally id. 102–103. 
 92 See infra Part I.B.2. 
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like Schwartz and Scott’s leading theoretical economic argument 
discussed in Section A, are attentive to the costs of adjudication.93 In 
particular, they seek to balance those costs against the economic 
benefits of a more informed judicial interpretive method that is more 
likely to produce a correct answer in individual cases. Given this 
pattern, it may be helpful to note that while litigation costs are not 
insignificant, they are a vanishingly small part of the total value of all 
contracts — of all gains through trade in the economy of the United 
States. Tampering with the latter out of excessive concern with the 
former poses, at the least, a significant danger of economic loss. 
Although evidence is not comprehensive, it appears that a typical 
contract case costs between $70,000 and $100,000 if litigated to trial.94 
In 2005, state courts in the United States decided 8,917 contracts 
cases,95 implying that cases that led to resolution in court cost less than 
$900 million. In 2005, the gross domestic product (“GDP”) of the 
United States was $14.37 trillion. Of course, $900 million is a significant 
amount; as the old joke goes, add $900 million here and $900 million 
there, and eventually you’re dealing with real money.96 Nonetheless, 
$900 million is .006% (or one in about 16,000) of the GDP. 
Of course, most cases settle, perhaps before being counted in these 
statistics. The effect of the default interpretive regime on settlement 
rates is complicated and contested, but even Schwartz and Scott seem 
to admit that their textualist proposal would not increase settlement 
rates.97 As a result, the only question at stake seems to be: to what 
extent can we reduce the 0.006% drain on the economy that contract 
 
 93 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 94 See Adam J. Eckstein & Matthew P. Gabriel, Alternatives to Arbitration: Reconsidering 
the Use of Arbitration Provisions in Contracts, US LAW (Fall/Winter 2003), 
http://www.martintate.com/article_Eckstein_Gabriel_USLAW_mag.pdf; Paula Hannaford-
Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, 20 CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 1, 
7 (2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csph_ 
online2.ashx. 
 95 DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., 
CONTRACT BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbajtsc05.pdf. 
 96 The joke is often attributed to the American politician Everett Dirksen. See 
Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen Dies, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/ 
artandhistory/history/minute/Senator_Everett_Mckinley_Dirksen_Dies.htm (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2015). 
 97 See Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4, at 968-71 (arguing that more 
precision in interpretive results should increase the likelihood of settlement if it has 
any effect at all); see also Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 933 n.21 
(apparently agreeing that for risk-neutral firms, the default meta-interpretive rule will 
not influence settlement rates). 
  
2016] Contract Meta-Interpretation 1121 
litigation represents? If the litigation were solely a loss, this might be a 
productive question for a very small administrative agency to consider; 
the problem, however, is that the economy receives something 
substantial for that $900 million: it receives a reliable adjudicatory 
system that backs up the commercial deals of American businesses. 
How much is it appropriate to risk in order to reduce that cost? 
Moreover, how much would textualism reduce it; would it even make 
a significant difference in the total amount, keeping in mind that the 
typical difference between textualism and contextualism involves only 
the production of such evidence as trade usage and evidence of course 
of dealing?98 Despite general popular rhetoric suggesting the waste 
associated with litigation,99 I am aware of no empirical evidence 
suggesting that the economic savings in reducing the evidentiary base 
for commercial litigation would be significant. 
The remainder of this Section considers the limited, specific 
empirical evidence about parties’ meta-interpretive preferences 
specifically, and it addresses conceptual problems with the use of such 
evidence to justify default rules in modern contract law. 
1. The Limited Empirical Evidence of Parties’ Meta-Interpretive 
Preferences 
As commentators on all sides of the debate seem to agree, empirical 
evidence of parties’ meta-interpretive preferences is extremely 
limited.100 Professor Geoffrey Miller and the late Professor Ted 
Eisenberg conducted one significant recent study in which they found 
that, in contracts with choice-of-law clauses to which public 
companies are parties, the parties more often choose the law of New 
York than that of any other state.101 Schwartz and Scott take this to be 
significant because, having characterized New York’s meta-interpretive 
contract law as textualist, they believe the choice of New York reflects 
a choice by contracting parties in favor of textualism.102 
 
 98 See Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 574-77. 
 99 See generally Shawn J. Bayern, Comment, Explaining the American Norm Against 
Litigation, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1697, 1705-11 (2005) (citing popular sources). 
 100 See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 955 (referring to the 
“sketchy evidence that exists”). 
 101 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical 
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ 
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1511 (2009) (“Although no state has more than 
50 percent of the designations, New York is clearly the dominant state with over 40 
percent of the choices of law . . . designations.”). 
 102 Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 956. 
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There are several problems with such an inference, however. Most 
importantly, Eisenberg and Miller give several other explanations for a 
choice of New York law that confound specific empirical inferences as 
to parties’ motives: 
Since at least the early nineteenth century New York State, and 
especially New York City, have played a special role in the 
nation’s commercial activity. New York has a keen awareness 
of the financial benefits of choice of law provisions and has 
cultivated its role as the choice of law for commercial matters 
through early efforts to promote enforceability of arbitration 
clauses, through legislation, and through the creation of 
specialized business courts.103 
As Eisenberg and Miller also point out, there are many provisions of 
substantive New York law that public firms might favor; an inference 
that they are specifically choosing textualism is unfounded. 
There are several further problems with the inference from this 
study that firms prefer textualism. One is that Professors Eisenberg 
and Miller have studied only public companies,104 not all the firms to 
which Schwartz and Scott intend to apply their analysis.105 Another, 
perhaps more significant, problem is that there is a wide variety in the 
choices of law that even large public firms have made. New York’s law, 
recall, was chosen in fewer than half the cases that Eisenberg and 
Miller studied, and for particular types of contracts, the choice is even 
less evident.106 Thus, public firms chose New York law in only about 
25% of cases involving the purchasing of assets, only about 20% in 
licensing agreements, only 17% in mergers, and, perhaps of special 
note, in only 18% of cases involving legal settlements, where regularity 
of administration is presumably of special importance to at least one of 
the parties.107 Indeed, in settlement contracts, parties chose California 
law — Schwartz’s and Scott’s paradigmatic contextualist regime108 — 
about as often as they chose New York.109 The picture that the limited 
empirical data paints is one of variety, not one of consistency. 
 
 103 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 101, at 1481. 
 104 See id. at 1475, 1511. 
 105 See Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 952-55. 
 106 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 101, at 1491. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 956. 
 109 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 101, at 1491. 
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2. Conceptual Problems with Empirical Approaches 
Aside from the limitations in the empirical evidence, there are two 
theoretical reasons to be skeptical of drawing strong inferences, in this 
particular debate, from studies like Eisenberg and Miller’s. One is that 
if parties particularly want textualism, they can ask for it, so there is 
little reason to use choice-of-law clauses as a proxy for the underlying 
substantive choice.110 Moreover, parties can choose arbitration, in 
which they can certainly lay out their own rules of evidence. While it 
may be difficult to arrange, from scratch, for the sort of private legal 
system that Lisa Bernstein characterizes in several studies,111 it is not 
difficult to opt out of the public legal system if it does not provide for 
parties’ desired rules or the opportunity to choose such rules.112 
But there is a deeper and more important problem with the focus on 
the empirically demonstrated preferences of broad classes of 
contracting parties. Specifically, in deciding meta-interpretive rules, 
we are not limited to a single, majoritarian regime. Schwartz and Scott 
recognize this; indeed, I consider their argument innovative in this 
regard.113 But just as the legal system need not answer the meta-
interpretive question identically for contracts involving individuals 
and contracts among firms (as they suggest),114 it need not answer the 
question identically for all contracts involving firms. 
Perhaps the notion of “majoritarian defaults” has caused some 
confusion. The concept of majoritarian defaults is common in the 
theoretical legal and economic commentary on contract law.115 As 
Professor Russell Korobkin puts it: 
 
 110 This is, admittedly, the subject of some debate, because Schwartz and Scott 
deny that interpretive rules are default rules, rather than mandatory rules, in current 
law. I consider this matter further in Part III. 
 111 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1996); Lisa 
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1724 (2001); Lisa 
Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A 
Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 711 (1999). 
 112 See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the 
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 696-99 
(2001) (discussing courts’ stated public policies in favor of arbitration). See generally 
Marissa Dawn Lawson, Note, Judicial Economy at What Cost? An Argument for Finding 
Binding Arbitration Clauses Prima Facie Unconscionable, 23 REV. LITIG. 463, 463-64 
(2004) (critiquing the ease with which arbitration clauses in contracts can displace the 
public legal system). 
 113 See supra note 12. 
 114 See Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 947 n.49. See generally supra Part I. 
 115 See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. 
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The traditional analysis concludes that default contract terms 
should mimic those terms that the majority of contracting 
parties would agree upon if negotiating and drafting a relevant 
provision were cost-free. Default rules created according to 
this process, often referred to as “majoritarian” defaults, 
minimize the number of occasions in which parties will need 
to contract around default rules in order to arrive at an 
efficient outcome.116 
Used properly, this notion can serve as a useful theoretical device in 
analyzing default rules in contract law — for example, in 
distinguishing commonplace rules from “penalty defaults.”117 But the 
concept may also confuse analysis because it suggests that default 
rules should be decided by vote, rather than by a sensitive analysis of 
factors present in particular cases. What is at issue here, in some 
sense, is improving the “resolving power” of contract law, as with a 
microscope; a focus on choosing the right “majoritarian default” can 
easily obscure the more important analytical exercise in which courts 
are typically engaged, which is to determine which features of a case 
trigger relevant legal principles. That broader analysis — essentially an 
attempt to address a reference-class problem118 — may well produce 
insights that are absent if cases are grossly lumped together and then 
decided as the majority would decide them. Perhaps this is why the 
notion of “majoritarian defaults” has made almost no impact in courts, 
compared to academic commentary.119 When courts interpret 
 
L. REV. 1603, 1632 (2009) (“Majoritarian default rules maximize the probability that 
the terms to which promisors are being held correspond with the ones they intended 
but failed to express or imply, and they save the majority of individuals the costs of 
specifying those terms, which respects their personal sovereignty by decreasing the 
barriers to creating promissory obligations.”). 
 116 Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 608, 613-14 (1998). 
 117 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 101-07 (1989); see, e.g., Ian Ayres, 
Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 585, 586 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Richard Craswell, 
Contract Law: General Theories, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 3-4 
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
 118 In statistical reasoning, there is often a preliminary problem of identifying a 
reference class for appropriate analysis. See HANS REICHENBACH, THE THEORY OF 
PROBABILITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
CALCULUS OF PROBABILITY 374-78 (1949). For a modern discussion in a legal context, 
see generally Edward K. Cheng, Law, Statistics, and the Reference Class Problem, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 92 (2009). 
 119 As of December 24, 2015, the phrase “majoritarian default,” according to a 
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contracts, they do not look ultimately to what a “majority” of some 
arbitrary group of parties would have done. They aim instead to 
determine what was “reasonable” for the parties “in the 
circumstances” under which they contracted.120 
C. Philosophical Arguments that Broadly Disregard the Preferences of 
Contracting Parties 
A further type of argument defends textualism on philosophical 
grounds that have little to do, directly, with the intent of — or even 
the interests of — the parties to a particular dispute. Inspired, broadly 
speaking, from philosophy rather than economics or legal doctrine, 
these arguments present textualism as desirable because it is more 
certain, more consistent with abstract “rule of law” values, more 
“legal” rather than “political,” and so on.121 
I have responded to many arguments along these lines in prior 
work.122 I have little to add here, other than to note that nothing has 
been offered to justify a rule in the general case that is at odds with the 
parties’ interests. If parties can agree to arbitrate disputes, it would be 
odd to refuse to let them structure their dispute in court in typical 
cases — particularly if all they attempt to do is to inform a court, ex 
ante, that they believe certain evidence to be unreliable and thus do 
not wish for it to be used in resolving their dispute (or vice versa). It 
would, accordingly, be strange to ignore the parties’ preferences in the 
circumstances of their contracting. On this point, I endorse Schwartz 
and Scott’s argument, with the limited exception that in some cases 
factors other than the parties’ expressed wishes may be relevant to the 
meta-interpretive question, in specific cases only, on grounds of 
justice or policy.123 
D. The Limits of Undifferentiated Contextualism 
Sections A through C in this Part have critiqued arguments for 
undifferentiated (or insufficiently differentiated) textualism. That is, 
 
search on LexisNexis, appeared in over 300 academic articles but in only three 
American court cases. 
 120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (1981). 
 121 See Bayern, Against Certainty, supra note 10, at 76-86 (discussing such 
arguments). 
 122 Id. (arguing that arguments that depend on a rule’s certainty or regularity are 
often misplaced and not logically tied to rule-of-law values). 
 123 See supra Part I.B; see also Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 952 (“[W]e 
urge courts to follow party preferences regarding the interpretive rules.”). 
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they have addressed problems with theoretical economic, empirical 
economic, and philosophical arguments that counsel a broad 
textualism for contract law. This Section addresses why a nuanced 
approach to meta-interpretation is more functional than a simple rule 
of universal contextualism — that is, than a simple rule that courts 
should always recognize all information that may have a role in 
determining the parties’ intent or other matters that bear on any 
interpretive matters. 
Whereas (as Sections A through C showed) it does not seem 
sufficient to derive preferences for textualism from parties’ general 
characteristics, features of particular contracting situations may well 
suggest that the parties intend for a textual document to govern their 
substantive rights and duties to the exclusion of other contextual 
information. The clearest indication of this occurs when a textual 
document, or set of them, is the object of specific, lawyerly 
negotiation. For example, if lawyers for both sides extensively 
negotiate specific, complex textual language that is customized to the 
parties’ situation, actually consider the writing a final statement of 
their deal, and make tradeoffs that affect the written document, it may 
be appropriate for a court to ignore other information in constructing 
the parties’ substantive rights and duties. This situation provides a 
useful demonstration of how meta-contextualism differs from general 
contextualism. When faced with a setting that may fit the template I 
am describing, courts should use all contextual information (including 
information about how the negotiations proceeded, how the parties 
conceived the written document, and so on) to make an initial 
determination concerning the interpretive preferences of the parties; 
that interpretive may well be a conclusion that the parties intended for 
their shared text to be the exclusive basis of their substantive rights 
and duties, in which case the court should ordinarily proceed on a 
textual basis.124 
A broader contextualism is insufficient in these cases simply because 
it is at odds with the parties’ intent. The parties may well choose to 
take the risks associated with textualism in exchange for its benefits. 
There is simply no reason to assume, in general, that parties do this; 
the proposition must be shown to apply to the parties in a given case, 
 
 124 This remnant of contextualism in the meta-interpretive inquiry concerning the 
parties’ interpretive preferences goes a long way to explaining the supposedly 
mandatory contextualism that modern law enforces. See infra Part II.A for more 
comprehensive discussion on this point. 
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or else courts substitute theoretical judgment for the efficiency and 
justice of enforcing individual parties’ substantive deals.125 
An even simpler case of the appropriateness of textualism in specific 
settings involves standardized financial options.126 Individual 
consumers may purchase or generate and sell economic rights on 
underlying securities, such as stocks, in order to speculate or to hedge 
risk.127 A universal understanding of such financial options is that, 
while they are contracts — and even contracts that involve individuals 
— their performance is standardized through a clearinghouse, tightly 
regulated, and subject to essentially no interpretive variance based on 
individual circumstances.128 
II. THE MECHANICS OF META-INTERPRETATION AND META-
SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT 
The touchstone of moral and efficient contract enforcement, in the 
first instance, is the parties’ actual agreement, to the extent that 
agreement exists. The actual agreement matters for moral — or 
justice-based — reasons because a significant justification of contract 
law is to give parties what they want, at least so long as what they 
want is not unconscionable and does not trigger another exception to 
the appropriate enforcement of contracts.129 Various justifications of 
contract law on grounds of autonomy, parties’ “will,” and so forth also 
depend on the parties’ voluntary request for legal enforcement to aid 
their business (or other) purposes.130 The actual agreement matters for 
 
 125 See generally supra Parts I.A–C (discussing the limits of generalized solutions). 
 126 See generally AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, LLC ET AL., CHARACTERISTICS AND RISKS 
OF STANDARDIZED OPTIONS (1994) (describing the legal nature and risks of 
standardized financial options issued by the Options Clearing Corporation and traded 
on public exchanges). 
 127 See id. at 18-22. 
 128 See THE OPTIONS CLEARING CORP., UNDERSTANDING STOCK OPTIONS 7 (1994), 
available at https://www.cboe.com/LearnCenter/pdf/understanding.pdf (“A stock 
option is a contract . . . .”); cf. id. at 5 (“Prior to the existence of option exchanges and 
[the Options Clearing Corporation], an option holder who wanted to exercise an 
option depended on the ethical and financial integrity of the writer or his brokerage 
firm for performance.”). 
 129 Mel Eisenberg has offered the most comprehensive statement of this view, 
begun in Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
741 (1982) [hereinafter Bargain Principle]. For Professor Eisenberg’s more recent 
statement of the goals of modern contract law, see Eisenberg, Emergence, supra note 6, 
at 1745 (“The basic contracts principle is as follows: First, if but only if appropriate 
conditions are satisfied, and subject to appropriate constraints, contract law should 
effectuate the objectives of parties to a promissory transaction.”).  
 130 For perhaps the broadest modern statement of this position, see CHARLES FRIED, 
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reasons of efficiency because it is the parties’ subjective conceptions 
that create the economic surplus at issue in contract law in the first 
place; a contract is only productive if the parties believe it is 
productive.131 If there were a costless, perfectly accurate way to 
discern and then enforce the parties’ actual, subjective agreement, I am 
unaware of any modern position that would oppose enforcement of 
that agreement on principle (putting aside, of course, appropriate 
defenses such as unconscionability or impossibility).132 Moreover, 
despite overtures to the classical “objective” principle of assent in 
contract law, modern law specifically recognizes, rather than ignores, 
the mutual understanding between the parties when such a mutual 
understanding is found to exist.133 
Of course, in the real world there is no costless and perfect 
mechanism to determine the parties’ subjective agreement; as a result, 
various objective conceptions of parties’ expressions come to matter in 
contract doctrine.134 But even so, the interpretive target — in 
 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1 (1981) (laying out the 
“moral basis of contract law”); see also Anthony T. Kronman, A New Champion for the 
Will Theory, 91 YALE L.J. 404, 416-17 (1981) (reviewing FRIED, supra, and critiquing 
Fried’s arguments). 
 131 See Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4, at 960 & n.53 (“Schwartz and 
Scott say that courts should aim to reach correct interpretations because (1) courts 
should hold a contracting person to do only ‘what he had agreed to do,’ and (2) 
maximizing contracting surplus ‘is unattainable if courts fail to enforce the parties’ 
solution but rather impose some other solution[, and courts should therefore] 
ascertain the solution that the parties actually adopted.’”) (citing Schwartz & Scott, 
Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 569); Eisenberg, Bargain Principle, supra note 129, at 
760-63; Eisenberg, Emergence, supra note 6, at 1745. 
 132 Cf. ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 572b (1971) (“No contract should 
ever be interpreted and enforced with a meaning that neither party gave it”) 
(referenced in FULLER ET AL., supra note 72, at 686); Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as 
Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353 (2007) (laying out a subjective view of 
contract enforcement).  
 133 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (1981) (“Where the parties 
have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is 
interpreted in accordance with that meaning.”); see Eisenberg, Expression Rules, supra 
note 1, at 1134 (“Where both parties have the same, unreasonable, meaning, one or 
both parties may have been at fault in their use of language, but the fault caused no 
injury. Indeed, a party would be at fault to press an interpretation of an expression 
that he himself did not attach to the expression”); see also Berke Moore Co. v. Phoenix 
Bridge Co., 98 A.2d 150, 154 (N.H. 1953) (interpreting a contract, even prior to the 
emergence of modern contract law, in light of the explicitly subjective “mutual 
understanding” of the parties).  
 134 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 21, 201 (1981). 
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determining how reasonable parties would interpret expressions — is 
the parties’ actual agreement if that agreement exists.135 
Nonetheless, just as parties may have agreements as to substantive 
rights and duties, they may have agreements as to meta-substantive 
matters — matters that determine how courts (or other institutions) 
are to construct their rights and duties. Thus, for example, an 
agreement to arbitrate is meta-substantive in this sense; it is an 
agreement of the parties not about their particular substantive 
obligations under a contract in the first instance, but of how their 
obligations are to be determined and enforced. Choice-of-law and 
choice-of-forum provisions — and even just substantive choices of law 
or forum, even if not explicitly expressed in written agreements — are 
similarly meta-substantive.136 Other provisions can, less obviously, be 
conceived as meta-substantive. For example, what Mel Eisenberg has 
described as “structural agreements” is in an important sense meta-
substantive because they do not dictate rights and duties but instead 
provide a contractual mechanism to facilitate the future development 
of rights and duties: 
In another kind of promissory structure, one party makes a 
promise that increases the probability of exchange, but that 
promise does not require either a promise or an act in 
exchange. I call such promissory structures structural 
agreements. 
Under the bargain principle, bargains between capable and 
informed actors are enforced according to their terms. This 
principle rests in large part on the premises that bargains 
produce gains through trade, that capable and informed actors 
are normally the best judges of their own utilities, and that 
those utilities are revealed in the terms of the parties’ bargain. 
Although the bargain principle is most conventionally applied 
to classical bargains, it applies to structural agreements as well. 
Structural agreements, like classical bargains, involve promises 
designed to promote economic exchange. The terms of 
 
 135 See Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4, at 960 n.53 (discussing interpretive 
targets). 
 136 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971) (“The law of 
the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be 
applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an 
explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.”). Note that § 187(1) 
appropriately distinguishes what was “chosen by the parties” from what might have 
been “an explicit provision in their agreement.” Id. 
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structural agreements, like the terms of classical bargains, are 
normally bargained out. And as in the case of classical 
bargains, the promisor in a structural agreement makes his 
promise because it will serve his economic interest. Reasons 
comparable to those for enforcing classical bargains are 
therefore applicable to structural agreements: structural 
agreements are entered into to produce gains through trade; a 
capable and informed actor is normally the best judge of his 
own utility; and that utility is revealed in the terms of his 
agreement. . . . A structural agreement is a governance 
structure that is designed and intended to promote the 
probability of gains through trade.137 
Just as parties may intend to enter into an agreement that facilitates 
future trade, parties may also structure their current trade, and they 
may express preferences about the resolution of differences. One such 
preference may be a choice of interpretive regime, such as a choice for 
the court (or other organization) constructing the contract’s legal 
duties to be contextualist or textualist. To the extent parties have 
meta-interpretive preferences, it is consistent with the bases of modern 
contract law — largely for the reasons Professor Eisenberg identifies138 
— for courts to honor those preferences in the general case. 
Note that just as ordinary interpretive questions often need to be 
resolved without direct evidence of the parties’ expressed intent — or 
indeed where it is known that the parties had no specific intent, 
expressed or otherwise, on the matter — meta-interpretive questions 
may need to be resolved similarly. Glanville Williams, a significant 
Welsh jurisprudential scholar of the twentieth century, outlined in 
1945 a framework that remains useful for characterizing different 
forms of what are commonly called “interpretive” questions.139 
Professor Williams recognized that a traditional form of interpretation 
of language included “consequences logically implied in the 
language,” but he observed that “the legal doctrine of implied terms 
goes much farther than this,” and he laid out three successively 
broader categories of implication. First, there are “terms that the 
parties . . . probably had in mind but did not trouble to express”;140 
 
 137 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Probability and Chance in Contract Law, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1005, 1009-10 (1998). 
 138 See id. 
 139 See generally Glanville L. Williams, Language and the Law — Part IV, 61 L.Q. 
REV. 384 (1945) (referenced in FULLER ET AL., supra note 72, at 444-45). 
 140 Williams, supra note 139, at 401. 
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second, there are “terms that the parties, whether or not they actually 
had them in mind, would probably have expressed if the question had 
been brought to their attention”;141 and finally, there are “terms that 
the parties, whether or not they had them in mind or would have 
expressed them if they had foreseen the difficulty, are implied by the 
Court because of the Court’s view of fairness or policy or in 
consequence of rules of law.”142 
This framework applies equally well to meta-interpretive matters 
and sheds light on the way that courts should divine answers to meta-
interpretive questions. First, the parties might have literally expressed 
an answer to the question, as for example some well-drafted 
integration clauses do.143 Second, the parties might have used 
expressions to one another that logically imply an answer to the 
question, as for example some vaguer merger clauses do.144 Third, it 
may be clear from context that the parties intended a particular 
interpretive regime to govern them. Fourth, a court might infer that 
parties would have had such an intent had they considered the 
question. Fifth and finally, a court may decide on an interpretive 
regime for reasons of morality, policy, or doctrine. 
Accordingly, the resolution of meta-interpretive questions need not 
itself be merely interpretive, in Williams’s initial senses; it may result 
from the operation of doctrine, or from a court’s acceptance of 
propositions of morality or policy that suggest or require an 
interpretive regime to govern certain types of cases. 
The remainder of this Part lays out a framework for the resolution of 
meta-interpretive questions. 
A. The Intent of the Parties 
The first guiding principle for the selection of an interpretive regime 
is as follows: where the parties express a specific intent for a textual 
 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id.  
 143 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and 
Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 690 (2007) (“Courts should, and do, 
enforce the analog of merger clauses that recite such intentions as: ‘No liability 
whatsoever is to attach to any representations made during negotiations and before a 
final written agreement is signed.’”). 
 144 For example, it is common to see language like, “This Contract . . . contain[s] 
the final and entire agreement between the parties, and neither they nor their agents 
shall be bound by any terms[,] conditions, statements, warranties or representations, 
oral or written, not herein contained.” Greenfield v. Heckenbach, 797 A.2d 63, 68 
(Md. App. 2002). 
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document to govern them and for non-textual features of their course 
of conduct not to govern them, that intent should (subject to specific 
exceptions outlined above)145 be upheld. Thus, for example, a strong, 
specific merger clause that sophisticated parties voluntary adopt 
should ordinarily be upheld. The justification for this principle is 
simple and follows from the reasons that courts enforce the parties’ 
agreement in the first place. There is no overriding judicial interest in 
adopting a particular mode of interpretation if the parties have 
explicitly taken the risk that a court’s (or other institution’s) textualist 
interpretation of a document or set of documents governs them. Just 
as parties might take risks as to other conditions, there is no reason 
they should not be permitted to take this risk in the general case. 
Relying on text alone to determine the parties’ meta-interpretive 
preferences is insufficient, however. There are at least two reasons for 
this. For one thing, text alone, taken out of context, may not evidence 
an actual agreement between the parties, as the example of a strong, 
non-negotiated (and likely unread) merger or integration clause in a 
consumer form agreement makes clear. If courts were to enforce such 
an agreement, it would not be because the parties affirmatively agreed 
upon it. For another, other evidence may be insightful as to the 
parties’ preferences regarding meta-interpretive questions — that is, 
regarding textualism, contextualism, and other possible modes of 
interpretation. Even where the parties have not adopted a specific 
merger clause, other evidence may be helpful in determining the 
intent of the parties to be, effectively, textualists. For example, when 
sophisticated parties conduct an extended negotiation about the 
details of textual language, it may become clear that they intend for a 
certain set of textual documents to govern them. Similarly, evidence of 
the circumstances of contract may well suggest that the parties 
intended for the text of a contract to trump more general trade usages. 
It is important to stress that the parties’ choice to use text, alone, is 
not sufficient as an evidentiary matter to suggest that their meta-
interpretive choice favors textualism. There are two candidate reasons 
for text to play this role (that is, for the mere use of text to imply an 
agreement that the parties prefer textualism), though neither is 
ultimately persuasive. The first reason is evidentiary; text is supposed 
to be harder to fake than evidence about, for example, course of 
dealing. But this is probably no longer true. For one thing, much text 
is now electronic, and electronic text is often changeable.146 
 
 145 See supra Part I.B. 
 146 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,660,819A (filed Jun. 15, 1970), available at 
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Conversely, because of the nature of electronic communication, there 
is often more evidence available to corroborate features beyond the 
text of contracts — like evidence of course of dealing or course of 
performance. For example, while in the past a written, signed 
agreement was difficult to forge and an informal conversation difficult 
to substantiate, today an electronic version of a signed agreement can 
often be subject to evidentiary dispute while the pre-contractual 
conversations (conducted, for example, by email) may be relatively 
reliable.147 Second, text may promote deliberation; there is some truth 
to the notion that a signed writing is what Lon Fuller called a “natural 
formality,”148 or a device that carries weight to ordinary people and 
suggests to them that a formal process carries substantive significance. 
Most people in American society would likely assume that signing a 
written contract alters their legal rights and duties in some way. But 
while writings, or signed writings, are enough of a natural formality to 
suggest that they have some role — and perhaps a significant role — 
there is no evidence that people assume that merely by signing a 
document they agree to be governed by the language of that 
document, as interpreted by a court, to the exclusion of all other 
evidence of the circumstances of the signing. As a trivial 
counterexample, it would be hard to believe that most people would 
expect to be bound to a writing that they signed under duress.149 More 
generally, however, even where parties intend to be bound by a signed 
document, they likely have no specific intent to be governed by a 
court’s context-less interpretation of that document, without regard to 
the way they (and their counterparties) understand language. At least, 
no textualist commentator has offered evidence that parties do 
typically have this intent. 
Indeed, while text is perhaps weighty in some environments and has 
historically served as a natural formality, natural formalities change. 
Much textual communication today is conducted online, in a manner 
 
https://www.google.com/patents/US3660819; U.S. Patent No. 3,161,861A (filed Nov. 
12, 1959), available at http://www.google.com/patents/US3161861. 
 147 For a general discussion of computer forensics, see EOGHAN CASEY, DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME: FORENSIC SCIENCE, COMPUTERS, AND THE INTERNET (3d 
ed. 2011). 
 148 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 815 (1941). 
 149 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1981) (“If conduct that 
appears to be a manifestation of assent by a party who does not intend to engage in 
that conduct is physically compelled by duress, the conduct is not effective as a 
manifestation of assent.”); id. § 175(1) (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced 
by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable 
alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”). 
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that is far less formal than the use of physical paperwork.150 Contracts 
can be concluded in written language that resembles a verbal or 
telephone-based conversation far more than a carefully negotiated, 
intentionally integrated agreement. As just one interesting example, a 
federal court recently ruled that the following conversation, conducted 
over an online instant-messaging network, had legal significance in 
modifying a contract: 
pedramcx (2:49:45 PM): A few of our big guys are really 
excited about the new page and they’re ready to run it 
pedramcx (2:50:08 PM): We can do 2000 orders/day by Friday 
if I have your blessing 
pedramcx (2:50:39 PM): You also have to find some way to get 
the Sub IDs working 
pedramcx (2:52:13 PM): those 2000 leads are going to be 
generated by our best affiliate and he’s legit 
nicktouris is available (3:42:42 PM): I am away from my 
computer right now. 
pedramcx (4:07:57 PM): And I want the AOR when we make 
your offer #1 on the network 
nicktouris (4:43:09 PM): NO LIMIT 
pedramcx (4:43:21 PM): awesome!151 
As the court put it: “A close reading of the instant messages and 
careful consideration of the behavior of the parties during the 
conversation indicate clear assent on the part of both parties . . . .”152 
This result is perfectly consistent with modern contract law,153 but 
more importantly, it demonstrates an exceedingly informal use of text. 
It is important to recognize that the use of communications media 
changes over time, often in generational ways; thus, for example, 
 
 150 See Alejandro Mosquera & Paloma Moreda, The Use of Metrics for Measuring 
Informality Levels in Web 2.0 Texts, PROC. 8TH BRAZILIAN SYMP. INFO. & HUM. LANGUAGE 
TECH. 184 (2011), available at http://www.aclweb.org/anthology/W11-4523 
(presenting ways of measuring informality in online texts). 
 151 CX Digital Media, Inc. v. Smoking Everywhere, Inc., No. 09-62020, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29999, at *10-11 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2011). 
 152 Id. at *19. 
 153 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(1) (1981) (“The manifestation 
of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or 
by failure to act.”); see generally Bayern, Rational Ignorance, supra note 4. 
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reports suggest that younger people prefer using text rather than voice 
for informal long-distance communication.154 It is hard to imagine that 
an invariant rule treating the use of text as a natural formality to 
indicate the adoption of an integrated agreement could be appropriate 
today, even if it ever was appropriate in the past. To put it bluntly, text 
messages transmitted over mobile phones are among the least 
deliberative forms of communication that now exist. In any event, text 
is quite varied; rather than pointing to a single sort of special, 
deliberative ceremony, the use of text points in no special direction on 
its own.155 
That said, many circumstances do suggest that the use of text is 
meant to exclude other evidence. Careful, back-and-forth negotiations 
led by counsel and aimed at producing modifications to a shared 
textual document can indicate the importance of the textual 
document. Certain regularized transactions, such as standardized 
option agreements,156 do likely come without a meaningful context 
beyond their textual details — and this is more likely to be the case for 
parties without significant prior history, or whose communication is 
mediated largely or solely by counsel. It is not text alone that creates 
this attention to text, however; it is the understanding of what parties 
expect the text to mean in particular situations. 
The second guiding principle for the resolution of meta-interpretive 
questions, then, should be that parties’ intent about meta-interpretive 
questions must be determined based on the circumstances of their 
contracts. Because any feature of the circumstances might matter, this 
principle requires meta-contextualism: that is, the use of context to 
resolve the meta-interpretive question. This principle stands opposed 
to one that might be called meta-textualism (i.e., that the mere 
adoption of text is sufficient to inform courts about the parties’ 
intended resolution to meta-interpretive questions). 
 
 154 See Dara Kerr, Teens Prefer Texting over Phone Calls, E-mail, CNET (Mar. 19, 
2012, 8:10 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57400439-93/teens-prefer-texting-
over-phone-calls-e-mail. But see AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., WRITING, 
TECHNOLOGY AND TEENS (Pew Internet & Am. Life Project 2008), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2008/04/24/electronic-communication/ (“[T]eens continue 
to rely primarily on telephone or face-to-face interactions . . . .”). 
 155 Regardless, in contract law and in deciding meta-interpretive questions in 
particular, the extent to which text is a natural formality is entirely an empirical fact, 
and nothing dictates its use from first principles (unlike, perhaps, in constitutional 
law where there is at least a preliminary argument that what the various houses of 
Congress and the President “passed” was the text of a bill). 
 156 For an introduction to standardized options, see THE OPTIONS CLEARING CORP., 
supra note 128. 
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The distinction between meta-contextualism and simple 
contextualism is significant, because it points the way to a resolution 
that has so far eluded courts and commentators. Some commentators 
have discerned a mandatory rule in modern contract doctrine in favor 
of a contextualist interpretive regime.157 But the ability to arbitrate, 
and the enforceability of strong merger clauses, suggests such a 
mandatory rule is not universal. One way to localize the mandatory 
features of interpretive rules is to identify meta-contextualism, but not 
contextualism, as mandatory in modern law. Thus, parties can change 
the interpretive regime under which their contracts will be 
interpreted, but they cannot change the mechanism by which their 
preferences about that regime will be interpreted. 
It is interesting to consider why meta-contextualism, if appropriate, 
should be mandatory. What prevents parties from having meta-meta-
interpretive preferences? For example, why shouldn’t parties have 
preferences about the manner in which meta-interpretive questions 
are answered? There is no theoretical answer to this question; the 
answer is simply that while it is common for commercial (and other) 
parties to have and to express preferences about the interpretive 
regimes that courts should use to construct their legal duties, it 
appears rare for parties to have or to express preferences concerning 
higher-order interpretive questions specifically. If parties had such 
preferences, there would be no reason to ignore them systematically. 
Moreover, even if parties expressed meta-meta-interpretive 
preferences (again, preferences about how the meta-interpretive 
regimes governing their contracts should be selected), the meta-meta-
interpretive question would likely require context in order to achieve 
the goal of meeting the parties’ expectations. At bottom, whatever the 
parties’ preferences, there is some level at which context is necessary 
to discern them. Otherwise, there would be no mechanism to defeat 
fraud and duress — or even, much more mildly, to give weight to a 
party’s unwritten interpretive preferences. At the final layer in the 
 
 157 See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 792 (1999) (“[N]ot only are past practices stronger than 
ordinary default rules and explicit provisions, but this hierarchy is mandatory [under 
the U.C.C.]: namely, the parties cannot easily opt out of it.”); David V. Snyder, 
Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and Conduct, 
54 SMU L. REV. 617, 648 (2001) (referring to “the difficulty of displacing custom and 
conduct [in interpretive analysis of contracts] (a difficulty which makes them ‘quasi-
mandatory’)”); see also Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 2, at 964 (“The rules of 
the Restatement, the UCC, and many jurisdictions are mandatory and require courts 
to use broad evidentiary bases when interpreting merchant-to-merchant contracts.”) 
(referencing Snyder, supra, and Ben-Shahar, supra). 
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interpretive abstraction, something more than the mere adoption of 
text is necessary to indicate that the parties intended for the text (and 
not other features of the situation) to govern them. Thus, if meta-
meta-interpretive preferences were common, then meta-meta-
contextualism likely ought to become mandatory. 
The distinction between meta-textualism and meta-contextualism is 
explained nicely by a distinction between the Restatement of Contracts 
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts on a particular hypothetical 
case. The case is as follows: two parties, fearing eavesdropping, 
establish a code so that the word “buy” means “sell” and vice-versa. 
Suppose, though the Restatement’s example does not make it clear, 
that other features of the situation establish that the parties further 
intend that their writings (plus the code) be the sole basis on which 
their agreements are to be interpreted.158 Under this prearranged code, 
the buyer sends a written “order to sell” (intended as an “order to 
buy”).159 Is this writing, from the perspective of the sender, an order to 
buy or an order to sell? The First Restatement answers with the literal 
text of the order, ignoring the code;160 the Second Restatement 
reverses this result.161 Clearly, the Second Restatement’s interpretation 
is superior; it permits parties to do something useful to them without 
compromising anyone else’s interests. But what if the parties’ written 
order were modified to further confound eavesdroppers? Suppose it 
read: “This is not a code, regardless of any prior agreement! This is an 
order to buy.” A meta-textualist would at some point, upon some level 
of strength or completeness in the writing, be committed to 
interpreting the order as one to buy; a meta-contextualist could extend 
— as I believe it would be proper to do, for much the same reasons as 
in the simple case — the Second Restatement’s reasoning to this more 
complex case.162 And the reason to extend the case is the same reason 
 
 158 Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 231 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1932), with 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. b, illus. 4 (1981). 
 159 Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 231 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1932), with 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. b, illus. 4 (1981). 
 160 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 231 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1932). 
 161 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. b, illus. 4 (1981). 
 162 In 1993, a Saturday Night Live sketch parodied a generalized version of this 
situation. In the sketch, a subway performer alternated between telling a passerby, in 
speech, “I don’t need your handout, man! I’m not a begg[a]r! I’m just playing here!” 
and, in song, contradicting this message with lyrics like “Please give me money. I’m 
very hungry. Please give me money so I can eat.” See Transcript, Saturday Night Live: 
Jeff Goldblum/Rob Schneider (NBC television broadcast Oct. 9, 1993), available at 
http://snltranscripts.jt.org/93/93csubway.phtml. The sketch nicely captures a tension 
that frequently arises in contract interpretation: At which time is the speaker’s intent 
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motivating the Second Restatement: it permits the parties to do 
something useful without harming anyone else’s interests. 
Apart from the individual features discussed above, there are many 
other features of cases that may matter in resolving meta-interpretive 
questions. If parties are not in fact risk-neutral163 — as I have argued 
most parties are not, and as most commentators agree at least that 
individuals are not164 — one important party preference, either 
expressed or latent, is to limit potential risk on a contract.165 It is often 
impossible to do this without reference to context. For example, if 
parties are taken to use language in a way that is not known to them 
because their trade usage is ignored, they potentially run significant 
risk that they will have duties much greater than they anticipated 
under all their contracts, and it will be difficult to avoid this risk 
because often parties that use trade jargon do not recognize that they 
are doing so.166 As a result, where necessary to limit the risk faced by 
risk-averse parties, it will be necessary for courts, in answering 
interpretive questions, to pay enough attention to context to recognize 
trade usage. This suggests, of course, that ordinarily, there should 
probably be a default rule in favor of contextualism, which explains 
the rules of modern contract law, as expressed in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts167 and the Uniform Commercial Code.168 
B. Mandatory and Quasi-Mandatory Bases for Meta-Interpretive 
Selection 
The intent of the parties should not be the exclusive determinant of 
meta-interpretive questions, for the same reasons that not all 
substantive rights and duties are under the control of the contracting 
parties more generally. For example, parties cannot enter 
 
more reliable when he or she expresses contradictory intents? 
 163 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 164 See Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 550 n.16 (“Individuals 
are assumed to be risk-averse while firms are assumed to be risk-neutral.”). 
 165 Cf. Eisenberg, Impossibility, supra note 1, at 209 (adopting a similar “bounded-
risk” principle to help decide cases of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration). 
 166 See, e.g., Dan Pallotta, I Don’t Understand What Anyone Is Saying Anymore, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://blogs.hbr.org/2011/12/i-dont-understand-
what-anyone/ (decrying several types of jargon). 
 167 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (1981) (“Words and other 
conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the principal 
purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight.”). 
 168 E.g., U.C.C. § 1-303 (2015) (giving effect to “course of performance,” “course 
of dealing,” and “usage of trade”). 
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unconscionable contracts169 or specify unlimited penalties as a 
remedy.170 These rules all have analogues in the meta-interpretive 
sphere. This Section briefly considers several cases in which parties do 
not, and should not, have free rein to pick an interpretive regime. 
1. Contra Proferentem 
One doctrinal rule possibly conceived as a mandatory (or at least 
quasi-mandatory) meta-interpretive rule is the concept of contra 
proferentem (“against the offeror”)171 — the doctrine that interprets 
forms against the drafter.172 This rule would have little effect if a form 
itself could displace it. It is not clear, however, that the rule is entirely 
mandatory. Consider a situation in which a sophisticated party, with 
an understanding of the relevant risks and the practical constraints of 
the form-drafter’s position (such as fear of reputational damage and so 
forth),173 agrees to accept any terms that a form-drafter creates. 
Nothing in general ought to prevent this in the right type of case. 
There is likely a sense, however, in which such an agreement could 
never be absolute; at least, the bounds of ordinary unconscionability 
doctrine would prevent such an agreement from committing the form-
taker to have agreed to such oppressive terms that they would amount 
to slavery.174 The situation roughly parallels that of a principal who 
agrees to waive the duty of loyalty of an agent; law and commentary is 
ambiguous on whether that should be permitted,175 but, even where 
 
 169 See id. § 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
 170 See U.C.C. § 2-718; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981). 
 171 For a general discussion of this rule, see David Horton, Flipping the Script: 
Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 436 (2009). 
 172 Id. at 434-38. 
 173 Cf. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 150-51 (2000) (outlining such 
concerns); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1253, 1257-65 (1999) (describing several potential reasons for parties’ behavior 
beyond incentives provided by the law, including reputational concerns and the 
internalization of moral obligations). 
 174 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 124-27 (C. Shields ed., 1956). 
 175 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2015) (“To the extent that, at law 
or in equity, a member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary 
duties) to a limited liability company or to another member or manager or to another 
person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability company 
agreement, the member’s or manager’s or other person’s duties may be expanded or 
restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability company agreement; 
provided, that the limited liability company agreement may not eliminate the implied 
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”), with REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP 
ACT § 103(b)(3) (2014–2015) (denying partners in general partnership the ability to 
“eliminate” the fiduciary duty of loyalty, but permitting them to narrow it). 
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absolute waiver is not permitted, waiver has a fairly wide potential 
scope.176 Though some courts would interpret forms against drafters 
even where the form-recipient is commercially sophisticated and 
represented by counsel,177 most courts no longer extend the doctrine 
to that case.178 Still, courts likely would not countenance an agreement 
to accept any terms a form-drafter might offer, regardless of the 
content of those terms. In short, the rule of contra proferentem appears 
to function more as a sticky default179 than as a true mandatory rule, at 
least where the recipient of the form is sophisticated. 
Against individuals or unsophisticated parties, the rule takes on 
more of a mandatory quality. Form terms must essentially, under 
modern law, be reasonable to be enforced.180 This rule may be 
conceived as part of a broader, meta-interpretive rule that denies the 
drafter of a bulk form an interpretive regime other than the one 
imposed by law — the one that filters form terms through a lens of 
unfair surprise.181 
2. Formal Preconditions to Enforceability 
The law occasionally overrides the parties’ meta-interpretive intent 
by imposing formal preconditions to the enforceability of promises. 
Thus, for example, regardless of parties’ concern for the interpretive 
value of their oral promises, where the Statute of Frauds applies an 
oral promise may not be enforced.182 Admittedly, these formal 
requirements are, under modern law, a relatively minor exception to 
the general principle of the supremacy of parties’ meta-interpretive 
intent, because courts and later statutes have consistently limited the 
Statute of Frauds; as Lon Fuller and Mel Eisenberg wrote: 
The best general guide to the judicial interpretation of the 
Statute of Frauds is to remember this simple truth: the courts 
 
 176 REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3) (2014–15). 
 177 See E. Bus Lines, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 509 A.2d 1071, 1073-74 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1986) (applying the rule of contra proferentem against a bus company and in favor of a 
municipality even though the bus company “had participated actively in drafting the 
contract terms”). 
 178 See Beanstalk Grp. v. Am. Gen. Motors Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 
2002) (citing several cases). 
 179 Cf. Snyder, supra note 157 (discussing such default rules). 
 180 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 & cmt. c (1981). 
 181 See id. § 211. 
 182 See U.C.C. § 2-201 (2015) (imposing a codified statute of frauds for contracts for the 
sale of goods over $500); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981) (outlining 
the rule of the Statute of Frauds that has become embedded in the common law). 
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have not favored the Statute of Frauds. Generally — although 
certainly not invariably — whenever the words of the Statute 
leave any leeway (and often when they do not), the courts 
have restricted its meaning and found ways of making an oral 
agreement enforceable.183 
But where the Statute of Frauds is applied, it substitutes a formal rule 
for the meta-interpretive intent of the parties. The force of the formal 
rule is that only the parties’ signed, written expressions, rather than 
the totality of their expressions, are to be interpreted to construct the 
parties’ substantive rights. 
3. Other Exceptions to the General Principle 
There are other ways in which courts might vary from parties’ 
intent, or from reconstruction of the deal the parties would 
hypothetically have made even if that deal is evident, in applying an 
interpretive methodology. For example, evidence could theoretically 
be ruled inadmissible under procedural rules, like the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, even though the parties would have preferred at the time 
they formed their contract that courts consider it in constructing their 
substantive obligations. Thus, for example, even “relevant evidence” 
may be precluded if it is “outweighed by a danger of one or more of 
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”184 Similarly, it is possible, as a general matter, that a court 
could exclude evidence that violates constitutional rights, legislative 
rights, or other matters of strong public policy; this doctrine has not 
been developed significantly by the courts in the context of meta-
interpretation, probably because it does not often arise, but several 
scenarios are possible. For example, in an extreme case, suppose the 
parties have an explicitly racist meta-interpretive intent when they 
make their contract; in that case, as a matter of publicly policy, courts 
should not permit that intent to govern meta-interpretation, just as 
they should not permit it to govern substantive rights.185 
Perhaps a more nuanced case would involve a meta-interpretive 
intent that shifts a significant decisional burden to the court; for 
example, if the parties intend that the court employ an overly complex 
 
 183 LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 1038 (8th ed. 
2006). 
 184 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 185 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981) (describing when terms 
are “unenforceable on grounds of public policy”). 
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algorithm to interpret their contract, it is possible that the court will 
simply not oblige them. The most significant implementation of this 
principle probably arises in the doctrines concerning the vagueness of 
the parties’ expressions of intent to one another; thus, for example, 
under the Second Restatement, “Even though a manifestation of 
intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be 
accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are 
reasonably certain.”186 
Others have urged potentially broader departures from the notion 
that parties should explicitly be able to control their meta-interpretive 
intent, although whether they do this and their impacts are 
controversial. For example, Professor Omni Ben-Shahar has argued 
that courts should fill gaps in contracts to favor the party with the 
stronger bargaining power, on the thought that the stronger party 
would have been able to fill in terms that suited its own interest.187 
This is itself a meta-interpretive principle; that is, it guides courts’ 
interpretations, instructing them to evaluate the general bargaining 
power of the parties in order to interpret their substantive obligations 
to each other. One problem with this interesting view, however, is that 
the weaker party may not agree with the stronger party’s (and Ben-
Shahar’s) general, meta-interpretive principle even where it would not 
have the power to fight specific terms dictated to it by the stronger 
party. At least, were Ben-Shahar’s argument valid, the recognition of 
the distinction between interpretive and meta-interpretive questions 
would commit him to the notion that the weaker party would indeed 
need to accept his meta-interpretive principle; that is, that the stronger 
party would indeed need to be able to extract assent from the weaker 
party not just on substantive but also on meta-substantive principles. 
III. META-INTERPRETATION IN DOCTRINE: THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
This Part briefly lays out some ways in which modern contract 
doctrine already adopts the meta-contextualism I propose. Note that 
the discussion in Part III.B also supports this proposition because it 
helps explain the law’s combination of mandatory meta-contextualism 
with default (but modifiable) substantive-contextualism. Specifically, 
 
 186 Id. § 33(1). 
 187 Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 396, 398 (2009). I have outlined some general critiques of this theory in an 
unpublished manuscript. See Shawn J. Bayern, The Limits of Bargaining Power as an 
Interpretive Aid (Fla. State Univ. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 381, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430704. 
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it suggests that (1) the choice between textualism and contextualism is 
largely under the control of the parties, and (2) this choice (i.e., the 
meta-interpretive one) is decided on contextualist rather than 
textualist grounds. The law on this matter is inconsistent, however, 
and the current state of the doctrine is not a significant feature of my 
normative argument; this Part’s sketch of the law is meant only to 
shed some light on existing doctrine and to suggest that what I 
propose is, by virtue of its partial appearance in existing doctrine, 
workable. 
The parol-evidence rule is the main mechanism by which parties 
may choose their interpretive regime under modern law. Rife with 
confusion, the rule — at least, the form of it expressed by the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts — is nonetheless largely consistent 
with the principles that this Article has outlined. 
The Second Restatement’s parol-evidence rule reads in relevant part, 
as a black-latter matter, as follows: 
(1) A binding integrated agreement discharges prior 
agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them. 
(2) A binding completely integrated agreement discharges 
prior agreements to the extent that they are within its scope.188 
An “integrated agreement,” in turn, is defined as simply “a writing 
or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an 
agreement.”189 This suggestion of the relevance of the parties’ intent 
for the writing to constitute a final agreement is confirmed by section 
209(3) and the official comment to section 209. Section 209(3) reads: 
“Where the parties reduce an agreement to a writing which in view of 
its completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a complete 
agreement, it is taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is 
established by other evidence that the writing did not constitute a final 
expression.”190 The comment to the section reads as follows: 
No particular form is required for an integrated agreement. 
Written contracts, signed by both parties, may include an 
explicit declaration that there are no other agreements 
between the parties, but such a declaration may not be 
conclusive. The intention of the parties may also be manifested 
without explicit statement and without signature. A letter, 
 
 188 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981). 
 189 Id. § 209(1). 
 190 Id. § 209(3). 
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telegram or other informal document written by one party may 
be orally assented to by the other as a final expression of some 
or all of the terms of their agreement. Indeed, the parties to an 
oral agreement may choose their words with such explicit 
precision and completeness that the same legal consequences 
follow as where there is a completely integrated agreement.191 
As a result, the Second Restatement’s parol-evidence rule appears to work 
roughly as follows: first, the court determines — using all available 
evidence, including evidence outside the writing — whether the parties 
intended a writing to preclude other evidence of the parties’ intent as to 
substantive rights and duties. If so, the court constructs the parties’ duties 
from the writing;192 otherwise, it does not treat the writing as anything 
more than it has found the parties intended it to be.193 
In short, this is just the meta-contextualist approach I propose. It is 
meta-contextualist in both senses important to my argument: it (1) 
separates the interpretive and meta-interpretive questions, and then 
(2) uses context to answer the meta-interpretive question. 
Indeed, the parol-evidence rule could be simplified if we stopped 
here. The Restatement, and much modern doctrine, complicates the 
matter by distinguishing further between “partial” and “full” 
integrations.194 In my view, such a distinction is a red herring. All that 
matters, as to the particular substantive question that has arisen in 
litigation, is whether the parties have intended for the interpretation of 
their agreement to be textualist or contextualist. This is true regardless 
 
 191 Id. § 209 cmt. b. 
 192 The Restatement is contextualist in one further respect, which is that it would 
use the context of an integrated writing to interpret it. See id. § 212(1) (“The 
interpretation of an integrated agreement is directed to the meaning of the terms of 
the writing or writings in the light of the circumstances . . . .”). While I agree that this 
is an appropriate default rule, my approach to meta-interpretation would require that 
the court first determine what the parties’ intent was as to the interpretation of the 
writing; thus, I would reframe § 212(1) as explicitly meta-contextual rather than 
contextual. It is not clear that the Restatement intends in § 212(1) to prevent parties 
from making a meta-interpretive choice, but the Restatement is clearly contextualist in 
this regard. See id. cmt. c (“The rule . . . permits reference to the negotiations of the 
parties, including statements of intention and even positive promises, so long as they 
are used to show the meaning of the writing.”). 
 193 See id. § 216 cmt. e (“[A merger] clause does not control the question whether 
the writing was assented to as an integrated agreement, the scope of the writing if 
completely integrated, or the interpretation of the written terms.”). This is so because 
the existence of the clause alone is only evidence — not presumptive evidence — 
about the parties’ intent.  
 194 See id. § 210 (defining “completely integrated” and “partially integrated” 
agreements). 
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of whether the written agreement is “partially” or “completely” 
integrated; indeed, the level of integration of the agreement need never 
be found as a general matter, because the only relevant legal question 
in deciding a case is whether the parties intended the writing to 
answer the question that has arisen. Much effort could be saved in 
determining the role of written agreements if this distinction in the 
parol-evidence rule were dropped and if courts paid attention simply 
to the distinction between interpretive and meta-interpretive questions 
— between the duties that the parties have agreed upon and the way 
in which the parties have agreed that the duties are to be determined. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern contracting parties often understand enough about contract 
law to have meta-interpretive preferences — that is, preferences that 
concern the interpretive regime that courts or other institutions 
should use to determine the parties’ substantive, first-order rights and 
duties under a contract. Recognizing parties’ meta-interpretive 
preferences is important simply because they may have such 
preferences; as in the rest of contract law, that parties have decided a 
matter is weighty and often dispositive. 
As with other interpretive matters, however, it is difficult to derive 
from theoretical principles what parties actually want. The world of 
contracting is too diverse and complicated to be reduced to simple 
theories that aggregate large groups of parties. The appropriate 
resolution to meta-interpretive questions should parallel the 
resolution of interpretive questions, and at least in the first instance, 
any relevant features of context may be necessary to determine those 
preferences in individual cases. This Article has defended the use of 
context to resolve meta-interpretive questions — a position it has 
called meta-contextualism. 
Treating meta-interpretive questions like other questions strongly 
suggests that meta-interpretive rules of contract law should be default 
rules, as commentators like Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have 
argued.195 That is, that such rules should be under the control of the 
parties. But the recognition of meta-interpretive questions as 
harmonious with other features of parties’ agreement should restore a 
focus on what actual contracting parties, rather than theoretical ones, 
prefer. Schwartz and Scott’s leading modern defense of economically 
motivated contract textualism answers meta-interpretive questions, at 
least for broad classes of business firms, based largely on an economic 
 
 195 See Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 596; see also supra Part I.A. 
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simplification of the world — namely, on the proposition that 
business firms maximize profits and are therefore necessarily risk-
neutral. In the economic study of actors, it has often proved helpful to 
characterize actors as maximizers of particular criteria; thus, for 
example, economists often say that individuals maximize utility, firms 
maximize profits, administrative agencies maximize revenue (in order 
to expand their influence), and politicians maximize votes (to increase 
their chances of reelection).196 
Like many economic simplifications, the proposition that business 
firms maximize profits is insightful and contains some truth. But like 
many economic simplifications, it is not in fact true.197 It is certainly 
not accurate enough to derive, in the general case, a broad risk-
neutrality among all firms that have five or more employees, or all 
firms adopting particular organizational forms, as Schwartz and Scott 
argue.198 As a result, while Schwartz and Scott have put forward a 
virtuosic argument in favor of textualism, it is an argument that does 
not, on its own terms, apply outside the theoretical world of academic 
economists. 
It may, however, be true that some parties do, in particular 
situations, prefer textualism or something similar to it.199 If parties 
have this preference, it should ordinarily influence the way courts 
construct substantive rights and duties. The reasons for this influence 
follow only from parties’ actual preferences, however, and it will 
ordinarily be necessary to look at context, rather than just text, in 
order to determine those actual preferences — at least at enough of the 
context to be confident, for example, that the parties are sophisticated 
and intended their merger agreement to apply. For sophisticated firms, 
this determination is unlikely to require even so much context as to 
require discovery; a court could likely, properly, decide that two 
public companies are sophisticated, were represented by counsel, and 
intended their merger clause to govern the rest of their contract. Often 
there will not be any way for the parties to dispute this plausibly. The 
door must remain open, however, to nontextual sources when it 
appears those sources suggest there was in fact no meta-interpretive 
agreement — or else, in applying textualism to the parties’ individual 
case, we would be doing something other than following their 
preferences. 
 
 196 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 46, at 16. 
 197 Similarly, it would be hard to explain all political behavior with the proposition 
that politicians maximize votes and administrative agencies maximize revenue. 
 198 Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 5, at 545-47; see also supra Part I.A.1. 
 199 See supra Part I. 
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Though the parties’ intent ordinarily should govern, both as to 
meta-interpretive questions and as to substantive questions in contract 
law generally, this Article has also outlined situations in which the 
choice of an interpretive regime should not be fully under the control 
of the parties.200 For example, it is appropriate that the rule of contra 
proferentem be difficult to displace, particularly in the case of 
consumer contracts and insurance contracts. 
In general, the law has tended to move toward the view that this 
Article has proposed. Ordinarily the law is not understood in this way, 
partly because it is overly complicated201 and partly because not 
enough attention has been paid to distinguishing interpretive from 
meta-interpretive questions. In the end, however, it would not be a 
radical shift to adopt this Article’s doctrinal suggestions. The shift 
would simply restore focus to the parties’ actual intent, as opposed to 
(1) on one hand, an aimless view of the role and mechanics of contract 
interpretation, and (2) on the other, a solely deductive, theoretical 
view that infers parties’ preferences without regard to what those 
preferences really are. 
 
 200 See supra Part I. 
 201 See supra Part II (discussing the needlessly complicated doctrines of “partially” 
and “completely” integrated documents). 
